DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION
巨大数量 [Huge Numbers] – Persian Gulf War analyses by PLAN strategists cited in
section one suggest a clear realization that relatively low numbers of laid mines (1100)
inhibited the effectiveness of Iraqi MIW.
Recall that the same analyses call for
developing methods for “high volume carriers for mines.”
Moreover, we have cited
above a Chinese report discussing submarine mine belts.
A Chinese analysis of the
U.S. mine blockade of Japan in 1945 concludes that the “high number of mines” was a
critical factor.
Some estimates of the number of mines currently required to blockade
which amounts to just a small proportion of most
estimates of PLAN aggregate sea mine stocks, as discussed in Section III of this paper.
“
”
先制 [First Control] – This phrase suggests a strong preemptive tendency in Chinese
writings concerning MIW. According to an article in Jianchuan Zhishi, “mines have
become an important component of the ‘first to control’ … combat operations …”
Another article from the same periodical observes that “Refitted civilian ships are
particularly suited for offensive mine-laying operations before the enemy has figured out
one’s strategic intentions” [emphasis added].
PRC MIW expert Fu Jinzhu alludes
starkly to the preemption issue in MIW when in an appraisal of Taiwan MIW, he asserts:
“…since Taiwan’s mine laying capability is already known, it ought to be easily
removed.”
Yet another Jianchuan Zhishi article, this one from 2005, hints even more
directly at preemption: “If mine laying cannot be done rapidly, it will probably be
impossible to accomplish MIW missions before the outbreak of war.”
高低技 [High and Low Technology] – PLAN writings commonly cite the cost-effective
nature of MIW. A typical graphic from a 2004 Jianchuan Zhishi article notes the costs of
Iraqi mines in the Persian Gulf War, $1,500-10,000, next to the costs to repair damaged
USN ships, which ranged as high as $96 million.
Nevertheless, it is also important to
recall the mid-2004 statement from Renmin Haijun that “China is not Iraq … It has
193
傅金祝 [Fu Jinzhu], “海
中的水雷 ”
湾争
[Mine Warfare in the Gulf War], 代 船 [Modern Ships]
No. 75, March 1992, pp. 30-33.
194
沈游 [Shen You], “海
中船
‘十思’”
湾争 装
[Ten Reflections on Naval Equipment Deployed in
the Gulf War], 代 船 [Modern Ships], No. 67, July 1991, p. 10.
195
林 盛 [Lin Changsheng], “ 在
潜 渊: 解放 水雷兵器的
展”
状与
[The Hidden Dragon in the Deep: The
Present Situation and Development of PLA Mine Weaponry], 展望
国
[World Outlook], No. 9, May 2005,
p. 33.
196
“Goals of Offensive Mine-laying Discussed,” Jianchuan Zhishi, 4 September 1999, pp. 10-11, FBIS
document no. FTS19991022001765.
197
Chen Fu-cheng, “Mine and Anti-Blockade Operations,” [book excerpt] Fang-wei Ta Tai-wan, 01,
November 1995, pp. 226-235, FBIS document no. FTS19990317001886.
198
Wang Guangxin and Chen Yijing, “On the Scene in the East China Sea: A Joint Military-Civilian
Minesweeping Exercise,” Jianchuan Zhishi, 4 January 2001, p. 5-6, FBIS document no.
CPP20010207000152.
199
“Goals of Offensive Mine-laying Discussed,” Jianchuan Zhishi, 4 September 1999, pp. 10-11, FBIS
document no. FTS19991022001765.
200
Fu Jinzhu, “Taiwan’s Problematic Mine Warfare Capability,” Jianchuan Zhishi, 4 October 1999, pp. 33-
34, FBIS document no. FTS19991108001755.
201
牛肜, [Niu Rong and Sun Fei], “中 海
国
918 型布雷” [The Chinese Navy’s Type 918
Minelaying Ship], 船知 [Naval & Merchant Ships], Vol. 7, No. 310, July 2005, p. 11.
202
傅金祝 [Fu Jinzhu], “伊拉克水雷失效的 般”
哪
[What Explains the Failure of Iraq’s Mines?] 船知
[Naval & Merchant Ships], August 2004, p. 45.
31
Convention