DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION
responsibility for “submarine escort” [ 潜任].
Thus, Chinese strategists note that
submarines are acutely vulnerable to mines, because passive sonar is not likely to be
effective in locating mines, and because submarines have very limited organic MCM
capabilities. Moreover, the surprise nature of the threat is likely to mitigate against the
success of the submarine’s countermeasures.
“水雷管理的
”
信息化 [Mine Management ‘Informatization’] – The integration of
information technology has become a major goal of contemporary Chinese military
reforms. The implications for logistics management practices, a priority for the PLA
since the Korean War, are particularly salient. Chinese naval analysts emphasize the
importance of transporting large quantities of different types of mines efficiently.
Additional reports suggest that the PLAN takes MIW logistics seriously, for example by
regularly culling obsolete weapons from the sea mine inventory.
布雷互相支持 [MIW/MCM Mutual Support] – Chinese naval strategists are
cognizant of China’s traditional weakness in MCM, and resulting vulnerabilities. It is
observed that “it will be extremely easy for an enemy to sow large numbers of mines
among the many islands and numerous harbors … along China’s southeast coast.”
Chinese MCM will not reach the technological level of Western MCM in the near future.
Although new technology and platforms, such as UUVs, are being studied, the basic
approach is likely to remain different.
Nevertheless, the exercise activity noted in the
preceding section does suggest a reinvigorated commitment to MCM.
This seems to
211
曹明, 梁 才 [Cao Ming and Liang Qingcai], “809 :
道”
[Ship 809:
Clearing the Way for the Battlefield], 人民海 [People's Navy], 22 February 2003,
p. 1.
212
冬元 [Chen Dongyuan], “神秘的水下 土--反 水雷的 展”
潜
[The Mysterious Undersea Sentry:
Developments in Anti-submarine Mines], 防科技
国
[Defense Science], January 2001, pp. 42-43.
213
牛肜, [Niu Rong and Sun Fei], “中 海
国
918 型布雷” [The Chinese Navy’s Type 918
Minelaying Ship], 船知 [Naval & Merchant Ships], Vol. 7, No. 310, July 2005, p. 11.
214
存先 [Zhang Cunxian], “ 水雷 技 兵的培 ”
浅
[A Discussion of the Training of Sea Mine
Warehouse Technology Soldiers], 海 院校 育
教
[Education of Naval Academies], No. 1, 1995, pp. 68-70.
215
Wang Guangxin and Chen Yijing, “On the Scene in the East China Sea: A Joint Military-Civilian
Minesweeping Exercise,” Jianchuan Zhishi, 4 January 2001, p. 5-6, FBIS document no.
CPP20010207000152.
216
The different Chinese MCM approach is likely the result of lower force capitalization, higher tolerance
for casualties, different operational goals, and most fundamentally, the primary anticipated conflict
scenarios.
217
China is also conducting significant MCM research. The synergies with MIW research are readily
apparent. See 佳水 [Jia Shui], “以光子系 排除水雷” [Using a Photon System to Remove Sea Mines],
激光
光 子
展
与
学
[Laser & Photoelectron Research Progress], 2001, No. 11; 夏立新 [Xia Lixin], “掩埋
水雷 磁探 的可行性分析”
[Feasibility Study of Buried Sea Mine Electromagnetic Probes], 水雷
船
与
防
[Sea Mine Warfare & Ship Self-Defense], 2001, No. 2;
刘 [Liu Jin], “使用 低 磁探
水水雷的可
极
浅
行性
究”
研
[Feasibility Study: Using An Ultra-Low Frequency Electromagnetic Field to Survey Shallow
Water Sea Mines], 水雷
船防
与
[Sea Mine Warfare & Ship Self-Defense], 2000, No. 2; 王金根, 李林
[Wang Jingen and Li Lin], “手持式水雷穿透系” [Hand Held Style Sea Mine Penetration Systems], 水
雷
船防
与
[Sea Mine Warfare & Ship Self-Defense], 2000, No. 2; 傅金祝 [Fu Jinzhu], “ 水雷和未爆武
器 行磁探和磁性 的 展”
[Progress Concerning the Carrying Out of Magnetic Surveying and
Recognition on Sea Mines and Unexploded Weapons], 水雷
船防
与
[Sea Mine Warfare & Ship Self-
Defense], 1999, No. 3; 是海梅 [Shi Hai Mei], “水雷通用自 中船模 信
探 ”
号
[A Discussion on
33
Convention