 |
Can China Become a Maritime Power?
| |
| | Unformatted Document Text:
DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION
Among the many military campaigns analyzed by PRC strategists, the Persian
Gulf War (1990-91) was singularly important, however, for shocking the PLA out of a Deng Xiaoping-era malaise characterized by declining defense budgets, low technology, and poor readiness. According to David Shambaugh: “In the PLA’s seventy-year history, only the Korean War produced such a thoroughgoing reassessment.”
18
Describing the
impact as a “jarring effect on the PLA,” Shambaugh explains: “[PLA] planners had never imagined the application of the numerous new high technologies developed by the United States … Nearly every aspect of the campaign reminded the PLA high command of its deficiencies.”
19
There is a noteworthy caveat that has been overlooked in such analyses and has
major implications for Chinese naval development. Not surprisingly, Chinese analysts scrutinized all naval aspects of the 1990-91 conflict carefully.
20
PRC writings concerning
MIW almost universally cite the damaging of two U.S. Navy warships during the Persian Gulf War.
21
One PRC specialist Fu Jinzhu, noteworthy for his prolific writings (in Chinese) on
all aspects of MIW and MCM, published a detailed and comprehensive analysis of mine warfare in the Persian Gulf War in the March 1992 issue of Xiandai Jianchuan [Modern Ships].
22
This analysis concludes that MIW played an unexpectedly large role,
demonstrating conclusively that mines are one of the most effective methods for weak countries to defend against strong countries, though Fu also is careful to state that strong countries can also effectively employ mines.
23
Fu contends that the successful MIW
attacks against USS Tripoli and USS Princeton illustrate the “relatively feeble” character of U.S. MCM. He argues that this is particularly true given the apparent weaknesses of Iraqi MIW, which Fu lists as: inadequate planning and preparation, inability to lay a
18
David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 2002), p. 74.
19
David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 2002), p. 69. See also Paul H.B. Godwin, “Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine,” in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (eds.), Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 46.
20
See, for example, 茹呈
瑶 and 夏 山 [Ru Chenyao and Xia Yin Shan], “海
中的水雷和反水雷”
湾争
[Mine and Counter-Mine in the Gulf War], 代 船 [Modern Ships] No. 64 (April 1991), pp. 51-58; and 海
,
涛 [Chen Shuhai and Chen Yingtao], “水雷:多 部 海上的唯一障碍”
国
[Sea Mines: the
Coalition Forces’ Single Naval Obstacle], 船知 [Naval & Merchant Ships] No. 141, June 1991, pp. 28-29.
21
This holds true for articles of scientific nature, for example, 田路, 伏虎, 城 [Tian Lu, Chen Fuhu and
Zhong Tiecheng], “反水雷技 的展
和
系
想”
概况
声 构
[A Survey of MCM Technology and Sonar
Development]
子工程
声学与
[Acoustical & Electrical Engineering] April 2004, p. 17; and 忠
刘
[Liu
Zhong], “ 路雷 及其被 定位原理”
网
[Mine Array Networks and Passive Location Principles], 海 工程
大
学学 [Journal of the Naval Academy of Engineering] Vol. 13, No. 6, December 2001, p. 20; as well as
for naval reference materials, such as 建 [Lu Jianxun] (ed.), 海 武器
装 [Naval Weaponry and
Equipment] (Beijing: Atomic Energy Press, 2003), p. 108; and the conventional military press, see for example, no author, “ 付航母 斗群的九 招 ”
个
[Nine Tactics for Coping with Aircraft Carrier Battle
Groups], 代海
当
[Modern Navy], Vol. 3, No. 90 (March 2001), p. 33.
22
傅金祝 [Fu Jinzhu], “海
中的水雷 ”
湾争
[Mine Warfare in the Gulf War], 代 船 [Modern Ships]
No. 75, March 1992, pp. 30-33.
23
Ibid, p. 32-33. The statement as written is somewhat ambiguous. This could be interpreted as Fu’s
suggestion that China, as a “strong country,” should also engage in mine warfare. Another possible interpretation is that Fu is emphasizing that strong states, the U.S. for example, have employed mine warfare extensively and could do so against China in the future.
5
|
| | Authors: Goldstein, Lyle. and Erickson, Andrew. |
|
| |
|
|
DRAFT – NOT FOR CITATION
Among the many military campaigns analyzed by PRC strategists, the Persian
Gulf War (1990-91) was singularly important, however, for shocking the PLA out of a Deng Xiaoping-era malaise characterized by declining defense budgets, low technology, and poor readiness. According to David Shambaugh: “In the PLA’s seventy-year history, only the Korean War produced such a thoroughgoing reassessment.”
impact as a “jarring effect on the PLA,” Shambaugh explains: “[PLA] planners had never imagined the application of the numerous new high technologies developed by the United States … Nearly every aspect of the campaign reminded the PLA high command of its deficiencies.”
There is a noteworthy caveat that has been overlooked in such analyses and has
major implications for Chinese naval development. Not surprisingly, Chinese analysts scrutinized all naval aspects of the 1990-91 conflict carefully.
PRC writings concerning
MIW almost universally cite the damaging of two U.S. Navy warships during the Persian Gulf War.
One PRC specialist Fu Jinzhu, noteworthy for his prolific writings (in Chinese) on
all aspects of MIW and MCM, published a detailed and comprehensive analysis of mine warfare in the Persian Gulf War in the March 1992 issue of Xiandai Jianchuan [Modern Ships].
This analysis concludes that MIW played an unexpectedly large role,
demonstrating conclusively that mines are one of the most effective methods for weak countries to defend against strong countries, though Fu also is careful to state that strong countries can also effectively employ mines.
Fu contends that the successful MIW
attacks against USS Tripoli and USS Princeton illustrate the “relatively feeble” character of U.S. MCM. He argues that this is particularly true given the apparent weaknesses of Iraqi MIW, which Fu lists as: inadequate planning and preparation, inability to lay a
18
David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 2002), p. 74.
19
David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 2002), p. 69. See also Paul H.B. Godwin, “Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine,” in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt (eds.), Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 46.
20
See, for example, 茹呈
瑶 and 夏 山 [Ru Chenyao and Xia Yin Shan], “海
中的水雷和反水雷”
湾争
[Mine and Counter-Mine in the Gulf War], 代 船 [Modern Ships] No. 64 (April 1991), pp. 51-58; and 海
,
涛 [Chen Shuhai and Chen Yingtao], “水雷:多 部 海上的唯一障碍”
国
[Sea Mines: the
Coalition Forces’ Single Naval Obstacle], 船知 [Naval & Merchant Ships] No. 141, June 1991, pp. 28- 29.
21
This holds true for articles of scientific nature, for example, 田路, 伏虎, 城 [Tian Lu, Chen Fuhu and
Zhong Tiecheng], “反水雷技 的展
和
系
想”
概况
声 构
[A Survey of MCM Technology and Sonar
Development]
子工程
声学与
[Acoustical & Electrical Engineering] April 2004, p. 17; and 忠
刘
[Liu
Zhong], “ 路雷 及其被 定位原理”
网
[Mine Array Networks and Passive Location Principles], 海 工程
大
学学 [Journal of the Naval Academy of Engineering] Vol. 13, No. 6, December 2001, p. 20; as well as
for naval reference materials, such as 建 [Lu Jianxun] (ed.), 海 武器
装 [Naval Weaponry and
Equipment] (Beijing: Atomic Energy Press, 2003), p. 108; and the conventional military press, see for example, no author, “ 付航母 斗群的九 招 ”
个
[Nine Tactics for Coping with Aircraft Carrier Battle
Groups], 代海
当
[Modern Navy], Vol. 3, No. 90 (March 2001), p. 33.
22
傅金祝 [Fu Jinzhu], “海
中的水雷 ”
湾争
[Mine Warfare in the Gulf War], 代 船 [Modern Ships]
No. 75, March 1992, pp. 30-33.
23
Ibid, p. 32-33. The statement as written is somewhat ambiguous. This could be interpreted as Fu’s
suggestion that China, as a “strong country,” should also engage in mine warfare. Another possible interpretation is that Fu is emphasizing that strong states, the U.S. for example, have employed mine warfare extensively and could do so against China in the future.
5
|
|
Convention | | Need a solution for abstract management? All Academic can help! Contact us today to find out how our system can help your annual meeting. | | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. | | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! | | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! | | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. | | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! | | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|