a greater role (relative to the memory of the attacks) in crystallizing popular support for
military policies. The Bush Administration became actively attuned to public moods, and
both learned from and shaped affective economies.
This learning process became particularly apparent in the lead-up to the invasion
of Iraq. In late 2002 and early 2003, opposition mounted, especially outside the U.S., to
an American-led military solution to Iraq’s alleged weapons violations. To forestall the
spread of skepticism among Americans, the Bush Administration stepped up its efforts at
popular mobilization. These efforts took a variety of forms. Perhaps the earliest form
was memorialization of 9/11 itself.
The Bush Administration made abundant use of the
spectacle of the attacks to sustain public enthusiasm for military response. As Maja
Zehfuss has argued, these efforts relied on a generalized understanding of how
Americans remembered the events and a simplified cognitive framing of the identities
and policies those events engendered.
A second form of mobilization aimed at
Americans’ fears of future attacks. Specifically, as Butler observes, the vagueness of
security alerts precipitated a “generalized panic” that allowed popular energies to be
allied with militarism and the internal policies associated with national emergency.
In
the fall and winter of 2002-03, efforts focused on publicizing intelligence about Saddam
Hussein’s weapons programs.
Intelligence information was supplemented with moral
condemnation of the brutality of Saddam’s regime and speculation about Saddam’s
belligerent intentions. Each of these strategies was layered with the political techniques
that had contributed to Bush’s popularity since the 2000 presidential elections: confident
20
. For a provocative analysis of these efforts, see: Zehfuss, “Forget September 11.”
21
. Ibid., passim.
22
. Butler, Precarious Life, 39 and 76.
23
. For an account of these efforts, see: Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command (New York: HarperCollins,
2004), 203-47.
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Convention