response to the discovery of Al Qaeda’s responsibility as “vengeance,”
was directed against an internal enemy rather than Al Qaeda or international terrorism as
such. Although it would be an exaggeration to suggest that most or even many voters
voted against their party allegiances, enough did so, or else reconsidered their decision
not to vote, to upset the PP incumbency. Irrespective of how many voters were affected
in this way, many more participated in public demonstrations and new public debate over
Aznar’s contribution to America’s war on terror and its intervention in Iraq.
most remarkable about the renewed public debate in Spain is its directionality: aimed not
at the external enemy responsible for the attacks but at an internal agent allegedly
responsible for provoking it in the first place. The more responsibility was attributed to
an external enemy, the more public energy was focused on critical self-examination.
This internal critique was expressed also as solidarity for the people of Iraq and
other apparent victims of what was perceived to be American imperialism. Many
Spaniards had viewed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq as a violation of international law and
a threat to global restraints on the conduct of war. Protestors in Madrid carried signs
forging connections between the fire-bombing of Guernica in 1937 and the 2003 invasion
of Iraq. And, on the night of March 13, protestors in Barcelona carried signs reading
“Madrid and Baghdad: victims of the same war!”
These gestures revealed a solidarity
with the Iraqi people, who were seen as victims of American imperialism. Whereas the
events of 9/11 were likened to the unprovoked attack on Pearl Harbor, the 3/11 attack
35
. This is García-Abadillo’s thesis in La Venganza.
36
. Describing both the Madrid demonstrations and the global demonstrations against the Iraq war in
February 2003, Burkitt suggests that “for a brief spell the protests offered a glimpse of the possibility of a
reconstituted public space of political affiliation.” Burkitt, “Powerful Emotions,” 680. I would add that the
“public space” that was refashioned in this case involved an expansive conception of the “public,” one that
extended political agency and moral recognition to the people of Iraq.
37
. It should be noted that the PP regarded popular response as an ill-conceived, primordial response to
the confusion of 3/11. The PP’s political rhetoric accused Spanish voters of being duped by Al Qaeda. The
Economist described the view of PP officials as: “A frightened and disorientated electorate voted with a
knee-jerk reaction.” “An Election Bombshell,” Economist 370 (20 March 2004).
38
. García-Abadillo, La Venganza, 106.
18
Convention