2005 annual report on Chinese military power. For the first time, the report portrays
China as a threat not only to Taiwan, but also to the wider region (U.S.
Department of
Defense 2005: 13).
In a sense, this renewed attention to China is little surprising. As stated before, to the
extent that the neocons believe that U.S. global hegemony is defined by both military
strength and moral clarity, China’s existence seems to be a natural nemesis to this grand
vision, and therefore must be taken seriously and aggressively dealt with. By swiftly
responding to the China danger, the neocons are often convinced that they have grasped
a window of opportunity. In the next section, however, I want to look at the
implications of this neoconservative strategy on China, and argue that instead of taking
advantage of a historic opportunity, their strategy is more likely than not to have
dangerous consequences for U.S.-China relations.
A neoconservative policy triad: implications for U.S.-China relations
In the social world, ideas are rarely politically neutral or value-free. To the extent that
ideas are believed to be reflections of social reality, they tend also to inform and
construct social practice and reality. Peter Winch (1967: 23) once said that ‘A man’s
social relations with his fellows are permeated with his ideas about reality. Indeed,
“permeated” is hardly a strong enough word: social relations are expressions of ideas
about reality’. Thus, suffice it to say that ideas about China and U.S.-China relations,
including the neoconservative ideas discussed above, are inherently constitutive of U.S.-
China relations via their influence on the making of foreign policy. In this section, I will
therefore focus on the constitutive impact of neoconservatism on U.S. China policy.
Neoconservatism could influence U.S. China policy in a variety of ways, but three
policies are particularly relevant here, namely, an encirclement policy pursued along
with China’s neighbours, a militant policy on China itself, and a destabilising policy
towards Taiwan. The three policy elements form what I call a neoconservative policy
triad towards China. Together, they could become a self-fulfilling prophecy by
provoking a more hostile China and making a Sino-U.S. conflict more likely.
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Convention