Alliance-building and the encirclement of China
The first element of the neoconservative policy triad is the building of what increasingly
looks like a strategic encirclement of China along its peripheries. Arthur Waldron
(2004: 63-5) insists that China may start a war with ‘every neighbour’. Consequently,
he suggests that the U.S. should ‘cultivate
a substantial entente of the democratic states
in East Asia’ to strengthen existing alliances (e.g., with Japan and South Korea), and
ensure ‘diplomatic coordination, secure communications, and the interoperability of
weapons systems in case of war’. Much to the neocons’ satisfaction, this strategy is
already being put into practice. For example, coincident with Japan’s desire to become a
‘normal’ state has been a recently strengthened U.S.-Japan Alliance. During their annual
strategic dialogue in February 2005, the U.S. and Japan for the first time identified
‘maintaining peace’ in the Taiwan Strait as their ‘common strategic objective’. Since
last year, U.S. and Japanese officials have been putting the finishing touches on an
agreement due to be completed in early 2006, in which U.S. First Army Corps
command headquarters are to be moved from America’s west coast to Camp Zama,
south of Tokyo (Halloran 2006). Also, Washington has reportedly proposed that
command operations of the 13th Air Force, now on Guam, be moved to Yokota airbase
in Tokyo (Tisdall 2005a). These moves are particularly significant in light of a
worsening relationship between Beijing and Tokyo.
Similarly, the neocons perceive Australia as the only ‘core ally’ in East Asia with which
the U.S. enjoys ‘a high degree of ideological and cultural affinity’ (Friedberg 2000:
208). For this reason, the U.S. has strived to maintain Australia as America’s ‘southern
anchor’ in dealing with China, although Canberra has for now managed to maintain a
delicate balance between the U.S. and China. As if this kind of ‘hub-and-spoke’ alliance
structure is not adequate in achieving America’s strategic goals vis-à-vis China, the U.S.
recently upgraded the trilateral strategic dialogues between Washington, Tokyo and
Canberra from a bureaucratic to a ministerial level. Australian scholar Purnendra Jain
(2006) describes this new triple alliance as a ‘little NATO’ against China. Before
attending the inaugural dialogue in Sydney in March 2006, Condoleezza Rice
emphatically stated that all countries in the region, ‘particularly those of us who are
longstanding allies, have a joint responsibility and obligation to try and produce
conditions in which the rise of China will be a positive force in international politics,
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