island’s ‘self-defence capability’ (Mitton 2005). Blessed often with not-so-subtle
endorsement of Taiwan’s independence, small wonder that its leaders have been over
the years edging towards precisely that direction. For example, in a short period of two
months this year, Chen Shui-bian, who confessed to have been ‘inspired by the thoughts
of George W. Bush’, firstly proclaimed on the New Year’s Day his long-standing wish
to push for constitutional change to reflect Taiwan’s sovereignty, and then sounded the
death knell for the symbolic National Unification Council in late February (China Post
2006). Predictably, both moves were labelled by Beijing as ‘dangerously provocative’.
In his recent book America’s Coming War with China, Ted Galen Carpenter (2006) at
Washington’s Cato Institute forcefully established the connection between U.S. support
and Taiwan’s move towards independence. He claims that U.S. commitment to Taiwan
has served to encourage hardliners in Taiwan to ever push the envelope on the issue of
independence because they are led to confidently believe that America will come to
their defence under any circumstances. In this way, it could threaten to realise China’s
utmost political nightmare. In such a scenario, analysts (Pinsker 2003: 357) suggest that
‘not even the most explicit US deterrence posture is likely to deter a concerted Chinese
military campaign against Taiwan’. Consequently, Michael Swaine (2003: 6) observes
that for the U.S. to follow this policy path without realising its potential impact on the
larger U.S.-China relationship is to ‘play a very dangerous game’.
This is dangerous in that this Taiwan policy is almost a sure recipe for further escalation
of mutual hostility. For example, in response to ‘Operation Summer Pulse 04’, one
Chinese military source said that all this ‘leaves China with no choice but to start and
end the war with lightning speed’ (Ching Cheong 2004). The China-Russia joint
military exercises in August 2005 may also be seen in this light, partly in response to
‘Operation Summer Pulse 04’, and partly reflective of China’s growing concern over
the U.S.-Japan alliance (Wu 2005/06). With Condoleezza Rice’s recent visits to Chile,
Peru, and Australia to prepare for another round of joint military exercise in the Pacific
in mid-2006 (Richardson 2006: 17), one can only wonder what new reactions China
may come up with next time around.
Conclusion
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Convention