It is mistaken to conclude that the current Bush administration’s China policy has
already been dominated by the neocons. Just as Sino-American relations are complex,
so is America’s China policy. For example, represented by Deputy Secretary of State
Robert Zoellick, there is a strong current of thought in the United States that China
should and can become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the international system (Zoellick
2005). Meanwhile, for its part, Beijing has tried hard to maintain a good relationship
with Washington, which was a central message conveyed by Hu Jintao during his recent
U.S. visit. Consequently, a conflict between the two countries is by no means inevitable.
Nevertheless, as illustrated in this paper, despite their preoccupation with Iraq and the
Middle East in general, the neocons have never lost sight of China, which they see as
both a military and a moral threat to their vision of America’s benevolent global
hegemony. In the past two years, their renewed focus on China has been particularly
evident. More importantly, while the neocons’ policy on Iraq may have lost much of its
credibility, their grand vision of an unparalleled American hegemony in general and
their China policy in particular are far from being discredited. Quite the contrary, as
evidenced by the recent resurgence of China-bashing in the United States, China may
well provide a welcome lightning rod for the neocons to both get away with their Iraq
debacle and regain political initiative.
Against this background, the paper has also examined the policy implications of the
neoconservative China strategy, arguing that this strategy is closely linked to an
emerging policy triad of supporting Taiwan independence, encircling Beijing with
military alliances, and strengthening U.S. military readiness vis-à-vis China. In doing
so, the paper argues that instead of capitalising on a window of opportunity to usher in a
new American century without a peer competitor, the neoconservative China strategy
could accelerate mutual hostility and conflict between the two great powers, resulting in
a dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy. Given the profound consequences of such
confrontation and neoconservatism’s enduring influence in U.S. foreign policy tradition,
it is now time to take the connection between neoconservatism and China more
seriously.
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Convention