freedom abroad (known as ‘nation-building’ and ‘regime change’), and taking pre-
emptive, unilateral actions against emerging threats if necessary. These elements are
clearly laid out, for example, in the founding Statement of Principles of the Project for
the New American Century (PNAC), a leading neoconservative think tank. In this
statement, PNAC calls for “a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and
future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American
principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States’ global
responsibilities.” Moreover, according to the statement, America’s global leadership
necessitates pre-emption, namely, the resolve to “shape circumstances before crises
emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire” (PNAC 2000). This radical
security strategy had remained dormant until it was brought to life by ‘11 September.’
In September 2002, much of the neoconservative strategy was absorbed into the U.S.
National Security Strategy, a ‘quintessentially neoconservative document’ (Boot 2004:
21). For the first time this document made pre-emption and unilateralism a central plank
of U.S. foreign policy.
Dangerous liaisons: the neocons and Sino-American relations
China as a ‘strategic competitor’ before ‘11 September’
Looked through the neoconservative conceptual lens, two characteristics of China come
into sharp relief: a rising power run by an authoritarian regime. As such, the neocons
believe that the ‘Middle Kingdom’ poses both a military and an ideological challenge to
their grand vision of America as the benevolent global hegemon. On the one hand,
China’s rapid economic growth and its associated military build-up, as the neocons see
it, challenge America’s military supremacy. On the other hand, the continued rein of the
Chinese Communist regime seems to sit ill with the neoconservative clamour for moral
clarity and global expansion of freedom. If the neoconservative foreign policy is defined
by moral clarity and military strength, it seems that no other country is better qualified
as a prime threat than China.
For this reason, it is not surprising that before 11 September 2001, China had figured
prominently in neocons’ foreign policy agenda. Indeed, it was the neoconservative
Charles Krauthammer (1995) who fired the first shot, calling for the containment of
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Convention