agreement on a modified version. In discussions in the upper chamber of parliament, however,
union and business representatives struggled over its provisions, with the former seeking
stronger protections against arbitrary layoffs and the latter resisting that, while simultaneously
demanding limits on the right to strike. (Deneoux, 2001:13)
This draft died as well, but a new
effort began under Prime Minister Driss Jettou, seated after the September, 2002, elections.
A tripartite accord was announced in the spring of 2003, and a new labor law was
promulgated in July. As with the other countries, this law traded greater trade union rights for
enhanced employer flexibility. It eases conditions for the hiring of temporary workers, by
allowing for temporary contracts of up to one year, renewable once, and shortens the time for
government processing of retrenchment applications by employers. However, the mandatory
severance payments for redundant workers are increased, which sparked some complaints among
factory owners. The law was also accompanied by a shortening of the legal work week and a
10% increase in the minimum wage. [L’Economiste, July 7 and July 9, 2003]
Flexibilization in Perspective
It is clear that the international financial institutions played a key role in fostering
flexibilizing reforms in the poorer Arab countries. It would be an oversimplification, however,
to trace the phenomenon exclusively to IFI pressures. The governments of these countries face
pressing economic imperatives, in particular a growing inability to provide employment
opportunites for high school and college graduates. Although there were few alternatives,
turning to multilateral lenders was nevertheless a policy choice, as the Syrian refusal to do so
illustrates. Nor can it be assumed that government officials necessarily disagreed with “the
Washington consensus.” In fact, key economic policymakers in each country were trained in
western institutions. While they occasionally complained about the pace of reform demanded by
the IFI’s and expressed fears of the potential for social dislocation as a result, they did not
question the underlying philosophy behind the demand for flexibilization and other neo-liberal
reforms.
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Among the main confederations, the UMT, which lacks ties to any political party but is sometimes said to
be close to the monarchy, appeared to have the strongest reservations. The independent confederation
charged that the draft would actually marginalize unions at the plant level, and put shackles on the right to
strike by prohibiting demonstrations in factories and actions targeting different plant sections on different
days. Moreover, they objected to the fact that workers could be jailed for illegal striking, whereas
employers resorting to arbitrary dismissals would suffer at worst punitive fines. Finally, as a means to
restrict businessmen’s evasion of the law, they were seeking a provision for local authorities to witness the
signatures of both workers and employers on hiring contracts. (‘Abd al-Hamid and Benzekri interviews,
op cit.)
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Convention