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Hung from the Mizzenmast: Pirate Attempts at the Formation of Political Communities during the 17-19th Centuries |
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Abstract:
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The paper analyzes attempts by pirates to form stable political communities. By drawing on Eric Hobsbawn's work on bandits and the state-formation theories put forward by Charles Tilly, the paper first asks what motivates violent sea-borne economic actors to attempt establishing political structures. Second, the paper looks at the failure of pirates and privateers to set up their own political communities. The first part of the paper puts forward three potential explanations for the relatively common attempts by sea-borne bandits during the 17th-19th century, to set up their own political communities. First, pirate political communities grew out of simple necessity. While operating at sea, as self-contained communities, where rules were enforced through coercion (or threat thereof), pirate ships behaved similar to the Weberian idea of what constitutes a political community. Second, on many pirate vessels, there was a specific normative utopian sentiment, emphasizing relatively democratic and equalitarian principles. For these reasons, pirating vessels have often been described as "republics-at-sea." This utopian aspect is also seen in pirate attempts at setting up political communities on land, such as on Tortuga, Mauritius, Borneo or in Madagascar. Thirdly, the attempts at formation of land-based political communities, was the result of the success of piratical activities which in turn, required safe havens, or ideally, trading entrepots (e.g. Reunion, Tortuga and Port Royale). The second part of the paper analyzes the success of pirates at setting up political communities, specifically land-based communities, since ships as "republics-at-sea," tended after all, to be temporary, contractual operations. Pirate attempts at forming land communities were possible because of great power inattention or encouragement. Ultimately, pirate attempts at the formation of land-based political communities have historically failed. While land-based bandits have sometimes been able to make the transition from robber barons to kings, pirates have not been successful in this regard. Both bandits and pirates thrive in anarchical situations. However, as land-bandits are more likely to be domestic actors, they risk retaliation only from one state; in the case of a weak state (i.e. anarchy), their chance to become a political force is significant. Pirates on the other hand, by definition act in an anarchical environment as international actors; as such they always face the risk of retaliation from more than one (powerful) state. |
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Association:
Name: International Studies Association
URL: http://www.isanet.org
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Alamariu, Dan. "Hung from the Mizzenmast: Pirate Attempts at the Formation of Political Communities during the 17-19th Centuries" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, California, USA, Mar 22, 2006 <Not Available>. 2009-05-25 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p100435_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Alamariu, D. A. , 2006-03-22 "Hung from the Mizzenmast: Pirate Attempts at the Formation of Political Communities during the 17-19th Centuries" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, California, USA <Not Available>. 2009-05-25 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p100435_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The paper analyzes attempts by pirates to form stable political communities. By drawing on Eric Hobsbawn's work on bandits and the state-formation theories put forward by Charles Tilly, the paper first asks what motivates violent sea-borne economic actors to attempt establishing political structures. Second, the paper looks at the failure of pirates and privateers to set up their own political communities. The first part of the paper puts forward three potential explanations for the relatively common attempts by sea-borne bandits during the 17th-19th century, to set up their own political communities. First, pirate political communities grew out of simple necessity. While operating at sea, as self-contained communities, where rules were enforced through coercion (or threat thereof), pirate ships behaved similar to the Weberian idea of what constitutes a political community. Second, on many pirate vessels, there was a specific normative utopian sentiment, emphasizing relatively democratic and equalitarian principles. For these reasons, pirating vessels have often been described as "republics-at-sea." This utopian aspect is also seen in pirate attempts at setting up political communities on land, such as on Tortuga, Mauritius, Borneo or in Madagascar. Thirdly, the attempts at formation of land-based political communities, was the result of the success of piratical activities which in turn, required safe havens, or ideally, trading entrepots (e.g. Reunion, Tortuga and Port Royale). The second part of the paper analyzes the success of pirates at setting up political communities, specifically land-based communities, since ships as "republics-at-sea," tended after all, to be temporary, contractual operations. Pirate attempts at forming land communities were possible because of great power inattention or encouragement. Ultimately, pirate attempts at the formation of land-based political communities have historically failed. While land-based bandits have sometimes been able to make the transition from robber barons to kings, pirates have not been successful in this regard. Both bandits and pirates thrive in anarchical situations. However, as land-bandits are more likely to be domestic actors, they risk retaliation only from one state; in the case of a weak state (i.e. anarchy), their chance to become a political force is significant. Pirates on the other hand, by definition act in an anarchical environment as international actors; as such they always face the risk of retaliation from more than one (powerful) state. |
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