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incorporation of KRNIC were drafted to give MIC authority over many of its activities.
This confusion is a continuation of historical struggles over KRNIC’s founding. While
MIC wanted to retain its regulatory power over matters regarding Internet addresses, due
to the initiative of the Ministry of Finance and Economy and the Ministry of Planning
and Budget KRNIC was made a nonprofit foundation instead of a governmental agency.
However, the close tie between MIC and KRNIC is yet to be broken. Many KRNIC staff
members are former employees of organizations that were founded, funded, and
controlled by MIC, such as the National Computerization Agency and Korea Agency for
Digital Opportunity and Promotion. These people lack private sector experience and are
keenly sensitive to the stability and conservatism of the public sector. Some KRNIC staff
members tend to perceive themselves as half-employees of the government and to
acquiesce to the requests of MIC.
The new role for the private sector generates additional tensions. KRNIC supports
a number of private committees, such as the Name Committee and the Name and Number
Committee, which are the central channel by which the civil society and individual
experts and activists participate in the decision-making processes regarding Internet
address policy. When the views and recommendations of these committees conflict with
those of KRNIC or make decisions that are not favorable to KRNIC, one of the easiest
ways to limit the power of these committees is to encourage the intervention of MIC. At
the same time, when the committees do not follow the instructions or suggestions made
by MIC on policy matters and make other recommendations, or simply fail to follow the
instructions immediately, MIC would also want to encourage KRNIC to ignore the
decisions of the committees or to simply implement the policies suggested by MIC. As a
result, there is escalating tension among the committees, which are private decision-
making bodies; KRNIC, which was designed to support and facilitate this private
decision-making processes; and MIC, which is the traditional governmental body. One
negative result of the growing tension is that many participants on these committees, who
are mostly volunteer experts with their own jobs and many other obligations, observe that
their evaluations and decisions are not followed. They become disillusioned about the so-
called private rule-making structure, and scale back their participation or simply turn
away from this process.
Convention