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Association: Name: The Law and Society Association URL: http://www.lawandsociety.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p117057_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Wells, Christina. "Why Deference? Judicial Deference to Government Actions in Times of Crisis" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Law and Society Association, Renaissance Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, May 27, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p117057_index.html>

Wells, C. E. , 2004-05-27 "Why Deference? Judicial Deference to Government Actions in Times of Crisis" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Law and Society Association, Renaissance Hotel, Chicago, Illinois <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p117057_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: This paper examines the accepted axiom that courts should defer to government’s actions during war time even when such actions potentially violate citizens’ constitutional rights. The paper questions two assumptions underlying that axiom – first, that executive officials are best equipped to determine when security needs justify liberty infringements and, second, that judges are particularly unqualified to meddle in security issues, even when civil liberties are involved. Relying on both psychological theories regarding the role that fear plays in skewing risk assessment and historical analyses of past crises, the paper argues that times of crisis lend themselves to unnecessary and quite deliberate expansions of executive power at the expense of civil liberties. Thus, the paper argues that such times may actually be the last situation in which judges should defer to executive action infringing civil liberties.

Judicialization of Administrative Claims: The Social and Political Impacts of Legal Actions against the Government

Time-out for excuses: Demanding action from African governments to stop child labor and mortgaged futures.

In Group and In Crisis: A Time Series Analysis of the In-Group Bias of Managed Presidential Rhetoric During International Crisis