Convention All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: The Law and Society Association URL: http://www.lawandsociety.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p117180_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Stucky, Thomas. and Heimer, Karen. "The Conditional Effects of Politics on State Prison Admissions in the U.S. States from 1977-1998" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Law and Society Association, Renaissance Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, May 27, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p117180_index.html>

Stucky, T. D. and Heimer, K. , 2004-05-27 "The Conditional Effects of Politics on State Prison Admissions in the U.S. States from 1977-1998" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Law and Society Association, Renaissance Hotel, Chicago, Illinois <Not Available>. 2009-05-26 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p117180_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Review Method: Peer Reviewed Abstract: There is now a large research literature that has examined the tremendous expansion in the U.S. prison population over the past three decades. Early studies focused on Rusche and Kirschheimer’s labor surplus- penal severity thesis, or the Durkheimian stability of punishment hypothesis. More recent studies focus on political explanations for variation in penal policies, with mixed results. For instance, Jacobs and Carmichael (2001) find that increased Republican strength increases prison populations across the fifty U.S. states in 1970, 1980, and 1990. Others, using similar methodology, find minimal effects of politics on penal outcomes (Beckett and Western 2001; Greenberg and West 2001). Therefore, the effects of politics on punishment are unclear. Extant studies of punishment have generally considered the politics-punishment relationship to be a direct one: greater Republican strength invariably translates to harsher punishments. Recent state politics research suggests that the relationship between politics and policy is conditional. Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer (2002), find that the effect of Democratic strength on welfare policy depends on the nature of electoral competition faced by state representatives within their districts. Following this logic, we argue that the effect of politics on penal severity will likewise depend on constituency-level competition. We test this hypothesis using annual state-level data from 1977- 1998. We develop and test hypotheses regarding the conditional effect of state politics on prison admissions using annual pooled cross sectional time series data across the fifty states from 1977 to 1998. Results show that the effect of Republican strength in the state legislature on prison admissions depends on the level of district competition in the state. Thus, it appears not to be a question of whether politics matters for punishment but when. Implications of the current study for the study of imprisonment and the politics- policy relationship, more generally, are discussed.

Growth States and Development: Political Institutions and Their Conditional Effects

The Counterargument-Disruption Model of Political Humor (CADIMO): An Experimental Exploration of the Effects of Late-Night Political Jokes on Cognitive Elaboration and the Conditional Effects of Partisanship