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Waging Wars in Iraq: The Metaphoric Constitution of Wars and Enemies
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5. To illustrate that this image is not simply a linguistic convenience, they suggest imagining a culture in which'argument' is considered in the terms of 'dance' rather than 'war': "[W]e would probably not view them as arguing atall: they would simply be doing something different." (Lakoff/Johnson, 1980: 5)
6. Deborah Cameron accuses Lakoff and Johnson of biologism (Cameron, 1992). Cameron does recognise, however,that Lakoff becomes more sensitive to this concern in his later work on the subject, Lakoff (1987).
Your claims are indefensible.He attacked every weak point in my argument.His criticisms were right on target.I demolished his argument.I've never won an argument with himYou disagree? Okay, shoot!If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out.He shot down all of my arguments. (Lakoff/Johnson, 1980: 4)
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It is more, however, than simply using the language of war to talk about argument. Rather,our understanding of what argument is, and the way in which we then set about arguing, arein part — indeed in large part — structured by the military metaphor:
It is not that arguments are a subspecies of war. Arguments and wars aredifferent kinds of things — verbal discourse and armed conflict — and theactions performed are different kinds of actions. But ARGUMENT is partiallystructured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of WAR. Theconcept is metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured,and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured. (Lakoff/Johnson,1980: 5)
The use of metaphors relating argument to war therefore constitutes argument as a particularkind of object. It is only once we recognise that the activity in which we are engaged is‘argument’ that we are able to participate in that activity, and the metaphors which shape ourunderstanding of ‘argument’ then make possible certain kinds of actions and not others. Theimage through which we understand an object, therefore, creates that object as an object of aparticular kind and also structures the practices in which we can engage in relation to that object.
There is, however, a fairly serious concern with Lakoff and Johnson’s formulation of the roleof metaphor in our understanding. They speak of the 'grounding' of our conceptual system interms of simple elements of our everyday lives which we can experience directly, withoutsocial mediation. Thus, for example, spatial metaphors of 'up' and 'down', 'in' and 'out' arebased on our experiences of the world — we have an inside and outside, we stand erect, wesleep lying down and rise when we awaken. (Lakoff/Johnson, 1980: 56-60) Lakoff andJohnson have been criticised for betraying a biological bias, and while they clearly want toground metaphors in part on our unmediated physiological experience of the world, they alsoallow for social rather than biological grounding: "In other words, these ‘natural’ kinds ofexperience are products of human nature. Some may be universal, while others will vary fromculture to culture."(Lakoff/Johnson, 1980: 118) Nevertheless, the very idea of ‘grounding’
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tends towards the assumption of a hierarchy of knowledge and the possibility of
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5. To illustrate that this image is not simply a linguistic convenience, they suggest imagining a culture in which
'argument' is considered in the terms of 'dance' rather than 'war': "[W]e would probably not view them as arguing at
all: they would simply be doing something different." (Lakoff/Johnson, 1980: 5)
6. Deborah Cameron accuses Lakoff and Johnson of biologism (Cameron, 1992). Cameron does recognise, however,
that Lakoff becomes more sensitive to this concern in his later work on the subject, Lakoff (1987).
Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.
I demolished his argument.
I've never won an argument with him
You disagree? Okay, shoot!
If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out.
He shot down all of my arguments. (Lakoff/Johnson, 1980: 4)
5
It is more, however, than simply using the language of war to talk about argument. Rather,
our understanding of what argument is, and the way in which we then set about arguing, are
in part — indeed in large part — structured by the military metaphor:
It is not that arguments are a subspecies of war. Arguments and wars are
different kinds of things — verbal discourse and armed conflict — and the
actions performed are different kinds of actions. But ARGUMENT is partially
structured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of WAR. The
concept is metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured,
and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured. (Lakoff/Johnson,
1980: 5)
The use of metaphors relating argument to war therefore constitutes argument as a particular
kind of object. It is only once we recognise that the activity in which we are engaged is
‘argument’ that we are able to participate in that activity, and the metaphors which shape our
understanding of ‘argument’ then make possible certain kinds of actions and not others. The
image through which we understand an object, therefore, creates that object as an object of a
particular kind and also structures the practices in which we can engage in relation to that
object.
There is, however, a fairly serious concern with Lakoff and Johnson’s formulation of the role
of metaphor in our understanding. They speak of the 'grounding' of our conceptual system in
terms of simple elements of our everyday lives which we can experience directly, without
social mediation. Thus, for example, spatial metaphors of 'up' and 'down', 'in' and 'out' are
based on our experiences of the world — we have an inside and outside, we stand erect, we
sleep lying down and rise when we awaken. (Lakoff/Johnson, 1980: 56-60) Lakoff and
Johnson have been criticised for betraying a biological bias, and while they clearly want to
ground metaphors in part on our unmediated physiological experience of the world, they also
allow for social rather than biological grounding: "In other words, these ‘natural’ kinds of
experience are products of human nature. Some may be universal, while others will vary from
culture to culture."(Lakoff/Johnson, 1980: 118) Nevertheless, the very idea of ‘grounding’
6
tends towards the assumption of a hierarchy of knowledge and the possibility of
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