Author's Keywords: elections, competition, spatial voting, candidate positioning, Congress, challengers	Convention All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: The Midwest Political Science Association URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p138013_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Buchler, Justin. "A Deterrence Model of Candidate Positioning and Electoral Competition: An Alternative to the Spatial Voting Model" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 20, 2006 <Not Available>. 2009-05-25 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p138013_index.html>

Buchler, J. M. , 2006-04-20 "A Deterrence Model of Candidate Positioning and Electoral Competition: An Alternative to the Spatial Voting Model" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-05-25 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p138013_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: This paper offers a new conceptual framework for thinking about competitive elections and candidate positioning. The paper presents and empirically tests a deterrence-based game-theoretic model built on the argument that incumbents do not moderate to defeat opponents-- they moderate to dissuade opponents from challenging them. When they face opponents, it is because they did not moderate. The deterrence model is based on more empirically justifiable assumptions than the spatial voting model, and in important ways, its predictions are more accurate than those of the spatial voting model. The model also has important implications for political reforms aimed at increasing competition in congressional elections. Specifically, promoting competitive elections by promoting challenger entry is likely to have perverse consequences by increasing ideological polarization in Congress

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