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Association: Name: The Midwest Political Science Association URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p139939_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Bell, Sam. "The Role of Veto Players in International Cooperation: Can Institutions Constrain Cooperation?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, Apr 20, 2006 <Not Available>. 2009-05-25 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p139939_index.html>

Bell, S. R. , 2006-04-20 "The Role of Veto Players in International Cooperation: Can Institutions Constrain Cooperation?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois Online <PDF>. 2009-05-25 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p139939_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: The cooperation literature largely measures democratic institutions in terms of how democratic a state is, ignoring the micro-level differences between democratic institutional structures. Much of the cooperation literature suggests that generally democratic states can make credible commitments, making cooperation easier. This still leaves unanswered, how democracies with different institutional structures will behave in international cooperation. I argue that increases (decreases) in the number of institutional and partisan veto players in a democracy, will lead to decreases (increases) in the ability to cooperate. Democracies with large numbers of veto players will be uniformly constrained, while democracies with fewer veto players will have the opportunity to cooperate, in turn leading to greater variation in the outcomes for these states. I examine my theory on a sample of democratic states for the years 1948-1979, using a heteroscedastic regression model. I test my hypotheses on both security and economic issue areas. I find that states with greater institutional constraints or more veto players are more constrained to cooperate, and states with less veto players have greater variance in their cooperative behavior.

Democratic Governance beyond the State: Normative requirements in the context of international cooperation in the environmental policy

Vetoing Cooperation: The Impact of Veto Players on International Trade Agreements.

Multilateral Cooperation in Spanish Decentralised State. The Conferencias Sectoriales and the Participation of Internal Levels of Government in the European Union