(Page 9 of 17) - Fear, Honor and Profit?: Ambiguity and Ideation in Thucydides' Athenian Speech authored by Tompkins, Daniel.

The final point to make in this section is constructivist: the decision-making that led to
the Athenian empire was culturally localized. Spartans do not act like Athenians: as a
culture, they emphasized “fear” and seemed to minimize “benefit” in both senses: they
were stingy about aiding others, and restrained in going after gain on their own. Brasidas
and Lysander were aggressive Spartans: both met resistance at home, and the state
provided no follow-up to their achievements.

Fascinatingly, the speakers enable “constructivist” analysis while using the language of
“realism,” maintaining that fear, honor and interest are universals. There is a parallel in
Chinese history, as sketched by Alaisdair Iain Johnston. Johnston detects a “cultural”
drive to offensive warfare, from the days of the seven Chinese military classics through
the age of Mao. The offensive inclination is so profound that Johnston feels justified in
calling “ideational,” even though it might, to an outsider, simply seem “realist” in the
Hans Morgenthau sense of a will to power.

So too, in this debate, we see Athens speaking as if Morgenthau’s “will to power” was
universal: but that very choice of words singles the Athenians out. They know the
Spartans will never behave like themselves.

III

“Human Nature”

“Much more than other animals, human behavior is underdetermined by our nature …”

Alexander Wendt

So far, we have noticed the characteristic language of the Athenians, and hten added that
this language reveals not a “compulsion” to behave in a certain way, but a set of free
choices. This leads to a third point, which concerns “human nature.”

16 Forde 1995, p. 151 suggests that Sparta has an empire of her own, over the Helots, and
if one defines “empire” sufficiently broadly that is so. But control of the Helots seems to
have been established by different processes than the foreign adventures of Brasidas and
Lysander, and the government’s uneasiness with the latter reveals, I think sufficiently,
that ophelia is not a prime Spartan goal. Thucydides himself has told us that Sparta had
for years arranged affairs in the Peloponnese to her own advantage (1.19): 76.1
acknowledges this but make it clear that Sparta has not yet won hatred. A glance back at
1.19 reveals two hatred-inducing activities Sparta has neglected: receiving ships and
tribute from the allies. "Imperialism" is so gross a term that it can be leveled at many
large states. But a glance at the texts shows that Athens and Sparta lead much different
"empires," even if one wishes to use the term.
17 Johnston 1996, pp. 228-229.
18 It would e worthwhile to explore the degree to which Sparta and Athens are "mutually
constituted identities." See Ruggie, p. 24, Wendt pp. 331-334.
19 Went 1999, p. 133.s