Author's Keywords: political regulation, democratization, campaign finance, party finance, money and politics, Mexico, party politics	Convention All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151168_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Poire, Alejandro. "In the Public Interest or a Poisoned Subsidy? Public funding of political parties: sub-national evidence from Mexico" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2009-05-24 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151168_index.html>

Poire, A. , 2006-08-31 "In the Public Interest or a Poisoned Subsidy? Public funding of political parties: sub-national evidence from Mexico" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-05-24 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151168_index.html

Publication Type: Proceeding Abstract: It has been argued that direct public funding of political parties is a catalyst of democratization and consolidation processes, both by leveling the playing field among competitors, and contributing to limit the abuse of state resources by the incumbent(s). However, in older democracies it has been criticized for the rent-seeking incentives it generates, as well as for its potential for decreasing political competitiveness. This paper integrates these perspectives into a dynamic theory of public funding of political parties, stressing the diverse effects it may have on party system development, and the role played by partisan incentives and opportunities in the implementation of this regulatory instrument. It tests some of the hypotheses derived from the theory using a database from sub-national politics in Mexico, and illustrates the theoretical insights through a narrative of the Mexican federal party finance enforcement system—itself a showcase of how both these allegedly “new” and “old” incentives may coexist.

The Effects of State Campaign Finance Regulation on Turnout, Electoral Competition, and Partisan Advantage in Gubernatorial Elections, 1949-1998

Political Parties in Brazil: Party Organization, Electoral Competition and Public Financing