Author's Keywords: coalition formation, formateur, bargaining, parliamentary democracies, two-stage analysis	Convention Convention is an application service for managing large or small academic conferences, annual meetings, and other types of events! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151302_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Back, Hanna. and Dumont, Patrick. "Making the First Move. A Two-Stage Analysis of the Role of Formateurs in Parliamentary Government Formation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2009-05-24 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151302_index.html>

Back, H. and Dumont, P. , 2006-08-31 "Making the First Move. A Two-Stage Analysis of the Role of Formateurs in Parliamentary Government Formation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-05-24 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151302_index.html

Publication Type: Proceeding Abstract: A standard conclusion of theorists who model bargaining as a non-cooperative game is that the party designated to make the first move – the formateur party – will have special powers over the outcome of the bargaining process. Most empirical studies of coalition formation in parliamentary democracies have paid surprisingly little attention to the process of forming a government. In this paper we model government formation as a two-stage unordered discrete choice problem that better reflects the game played by actors involved in the process. The first step involves the selection of a formateur party, and the second step involves the choice of government composition by the formateur. We derive a number of hypotheses for the two stages. To evaluate our hypotheses we perform analyses based on a data set of all governments formed in the Western European countries from 1970 and onward. In our analyses of formateur selection, we find that party size is clearly a dominant feature, the larger a party is, the more likely it is to become formateur. In the second stage analysis, we show that when we aim to predict the government’s composition it is fruitful to add information drawn from a first stage analysis. More specifically, we find that potential governments that include the party that is predicted to be the formateur are more likely to form, and that cabinets are more likely to form if they contain parties that are ideologically close to the formateur.

Legislative Process, Party System and Coalition Government Formation

Transaction Cost and Its Impact on the Service Delivery Modes Choice: _x000d_Two Stage Analysis – Nested Logit Model -