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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151324_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Tsebelis, George. and Proksch, Sven-Oliver. "The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Constitutional Convention" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2009-05-24 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151324_index.html>

Tsebelis, G. and Proksch, S. , 2006-08-31 "The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Constitutional Convention" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-05-24 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151324_index.html

Publication Type: Proceeding Abstract: Between 2002 and 2003, a European constitutional convention drafted a constitution for Europe. Two actors in particular influenced the negotiations in the Convention: the President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and the Praesidium. We first examine how the Praesidium was able to structure the agenda inside the Convention due to the absence of voting on amendments. The Praesidium was able to conclude every particular proposal-amendment round by accepting, rejecting or amending proposed amendments. We then analyze cases which show how the Presidency was able to control the agenda of the Convention. By investigating institutions, we demonstrate that the Presidency used several tricks to manipulate the result. We find evidence that (1) the Presidency filtered proposed amendments, considering only some of them, (2) it determined consensus in the Convention without saying how many members approve of a particular measure, and (3) it juxtaposed proposed amendments and concluded that the Praesidium proposal constitutes the best compromise. The second part of our agenda-setting analysis complements these cases by examining the timing of the Praesidium proposals. Analyzing the entire set of amendments in the Convention, we show that the Praesidium structured the agenda by presenting its draft proposals in multiple sequences. While the Praesidium could have proposed the entire constitution at once, such an iterated procedure resulted in fewer amendments over time. This suggests that timing was used for strategic reasons by the Praesidium. We support our hypothesis by showing that (1) some of the most important issues were presented at the end of the Convention, and that (2) the actual timing of proposals does not correlate highly with either the initial timetable or with the final constitution. We conclude that in the absence of majority or unanimity voting, agenda control mattered and thus the possibility of political manipulation.

Irish neutrality and the Development of the European Union’s Security and Defence Policy under the Lisbon Treaty: Compatible or Competing Foreign Policy Agendas?

Power and Influence in the European Union: Can New Member States Set the Policy Agenda?