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Inter-sectoral Goods and Labor Market Relationships, International Capital Mobility, and US Trade Politics in the 1980s

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Abstract:

This research undertakes a specific-factors analysis of trade politics in a world of cross-border capital mobility and finds that inter-sectoral goods market relationships and labor mobility do influence the patterns of industry lobbying for trade protection when foreign capital flows into the US. This finding confirms the superior explanatory power of sectoral models over factoral models of policy outcome in trade politics. Inter-sectoral goods market relationships imply input-output sales connections between manufacturing sectors. Each sector has two goods market relationships with other sectors: sale and purchase dependencies. This research argues that inter-sectoral business connections affect a given sector’s lobbying for trade protection when its business partner sectors receive foreign direct investment (FDI) and expand production. I pay attention to inter-sectoral labor mobility because FDI-receiving sectors usually pull labor from other sectors as shown in Hiscox’s (2004) model, in which labor is treated as a uniformly mobile factor. Unlike Hiscox, I allow a given sector’s level of labor mobility to differ from that of another sector. Statistical results confirm the following: (1) when a seller sector has no competitiveness, the more the sector sells goods to a given sector, the more likely it is to lobby for protection when the buying sector receives FDI and expands production, all else equal; (2) the more a sector buys goods from a given sector, the less likely it is to lobby for protection when the selling sector receives FDI and expands production, all else constant; (3) a sector with a high level of labor mobility tends to lobby for protection more when another sector receives FDI and expands production, all else equal. Industry lobbying for trade protection is measured by (1) financial contributions to the political campaigns of members of Congress who vote for a protectionist bill; and (2) petitions filed with the US International Trade Commission (USITC) requesting anti-dumping or countervailing duties during the five Congressional periods (1981 – 1990).

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sector (255), industri (198), labor (164), given (164), fdi (159), mobil (149), trade (147), depend (118), seller (114), effect (112), model (103), buyer (95), good (93), sale (93), capit (91), polit (89), foreign (82), increas (78), lobbi (76), us (72), protect (71),

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FDI, Trade, Interest Group
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MLA Citation:

Lee, Hak-Seon. "Inter-sectoral Goods and Labor Market Relationships, International Capital Mobility, and US Trade Politics in the 1980s" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2009-05-24 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151349_index.html>

APA Citation:

Lee, H. , 2006-08-31 "Inter-sectoral Goods and Labor Market Relationships, International Capital Mobility, and US Trade Politics in the 1980s" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-05-24 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151349_index.html

Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: This research undertakes a specific-factors analysis of trade politics in a world of cross-border capital mobility and finds that inter-sectoral goods market relationships and labor mobility do influence the patterns of industry lobbying for trade protection when foreign capital flows into the US. This finding confirms the superior explanatory power of sectoral models over factoral models of policy outcome in trade politics. Inter-sectoral goods market relationships imply input-output sales connections between manufacturing sectors. Each sector has two goods market relationships with other sectors: sale and purchase dependencies. This research argues that inter-sectoral business connections affect a given sector’s lobbying for trade protection when its business partner sectors receive foreign direct investment (FDI) and expand production. I pay attention to inter-sectoral labor mobility because FDI-receiving sectors usually pull labor from other sectors as shown in Hiscox’s (2004) model, in which labor is treated as a uniformly mobile factor. Unlike Hiscox, I allow a given sector’s level of labor mobility to differ from that of another sector. Statistical results confirm the following: (1) when a seller sector has no competitiveness, the more the sector sells goods to a given sector, the more likely it is to lobby for protection when the buying sector receives FDI and expands production, all else equal; (2) the more a sector buys goods from a given sector, the less likely it is to lobby for protection when the selling sector receives FDI and expands production, all else constant; (3) a sector with a high level of labor mobility tends to lobby for protection more when another sector receives FDI and expands production, all else equal. Industry lobbying for trade protection is measured by (1) financial contributions to the political campaigns of members of Congress who vote for a protectionist bill; and (2) petitions filed with the US International Trade Commission (USITC) requesting anti-dumping or countervailing duties during the five Congressional periods (1981 – 1990).

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Document Type: application/pdf
Page count: 62
Word count: 21952
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Inter-sectoral Goods and Labor Market Relationships International Capital Mobility and US Trade Politics in the 1980s Hak-Seon Lee Ph. D. Candidate Department of Political Science University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill hslee@email.unc.edu Paper for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Philadelphia August 31st – September 3rd 2006 Abstract This research undertakes a specific-factors analysis of trade politics in a world of cross- border capital mobility and finds that inter-sectoral goods market relationships and
the Census 1994. Current Population Survey Utilities March [electronic file] (Washington DC: US Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census) [producer] (Santa Monica: Union Research Corporation) [distributor] United States Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis Survey of Current Business: Benchmark of Input-Output Accounts of the United States 1977 1982 1987 and 1992. (Washington DC: Government Publishing Office) Weinberg B.A. 2001. “Long-Term Wage Fluctuations with Industry-Specific Human Capital ” Journal of Labor Economics 19:1 Wong K. 1995. International Trade


Similar Titles:
Inter-sectoral Goods Market Relationships, International Capital Mobility, and US Trade Politics

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