Author's Keywords: Ratification, compliance, climate change, international institutions, UN Framework Convention, Kyoto Protocol	Convention Submission, Review, and Scheduling! All Academic Convention can help with all of your abstract management needs and many more. Contact us today for a quote! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151417_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

von Stein, Jana. "The International Law and Politics of Climate Change: Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, Aug 31, 2006 <Not Available>. 2009-05-24 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151417_index.html>

von Stein, J. , 2006-08-31 "The International Law and Politics of Climate Change: Ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-05-24 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p151417_index.html

Publication Type: Proceeding Abstract: A major challenge for the creators of international environmental agreements is how to design mechanisms that deter defection without deterring participation. Indeed, relatively ‘soft’ international law often garners widespread participation, but it creates few concrete incentives for states to improve behavior. ‘Harder’ legal commitments make shirking more difficult, but these institutional features may deter from joining the very states whose environmental practices are least consistent with the treaty’s requirements. I argue that these institutional features have important consequences for the prospects of ratification: the harder a treaty is, the more ‘selective’ states are about ratification. Empirical analyses of ratification of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol provide substantial support for this proposition. As others have noted, one way in which states can mitigate this ‘dilemma’ that legalization produces is by creating agreements with flexibility provisions. I argue that states’ ability to use these provisions increases their propensity to ratify, even if it does not fundamentally alter the relationship between compliant behavior, legalization, and ratification. The empirical findings with regard to one flexibility mechanism – carbon sinks – support this argument. The results with regard to Activities Implemented Jointly, however, follow an opposite pattern, suggesting that states may sometimes use flexibility provisions as a means of legitimizing (or at least attracting attention away from) their non-participation in the regime. Finally, I explore how social networks affect ratification. I find consistent evidence that domestic and international networks matter for ratification of the Framework Convention, but not the Kyoto Protocol.

Why and When do Countries Ratify? A Mixture Model of International Security Treaties Ratifications

The Political Economy of Climate Change Policy: Did States Defend Their Material Interests When Negotiating the Kyoto Protocol?