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Association: Name: International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180083_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Lang, Wei. "Comparing China-EU and China-U.S. Textile Negotiation: How Domestic Trade Politics Shaped the Terms of International Negotiation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007 <Not Available>. 2009-05-24 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180083_index.html>

Lang, W. , 2007-02-28 "Comparing China-EU and China-U.S. Textile Negotiation: How Domestic Trade Politics Shaped the Terms of International Negotiation" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA <Not Available>. 2009-05-24 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180083_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: Like agriculture, trade in textile is a highly politicized sector in international trade negotiation. On January 1, 2005, the last stage of a four-stage phase-out of the quota system that has governed most world trade in textiles and apparel since 1974 ended. But there is an exception to that rule. Since January 2005 there have been alarming increases of certain categories of textiles from China to the EU and the U.S. Exports in the first 6 months to EU increased130% compared with the same period of year 2004. In the first eight months of 2005, China?s textile exports to the U.S. increased 50%. Beginning in March and April, both EU and the U.S. conducted investigations. The bilateral negotiation began in May respectively. China and EU reached agreement on June 11, 2005. It settled down the export quantities of 10 categories of Chinese products from June 11, 2005 until the end of 2007. With an agreed base quantity, the annual growth is set to be limited between 8 percent and 12.5 percent during the period. With a follow-up negotiation, on September 5th another agreement calls for roughly half the blocked Chinese textile goods due to the using-out of the quotas to be admitted unconditionally by the EU and the other half will count against China?s 2006 textile quota. This obviously became another victory of China side. The Sino-American negotiation was more difficult. After 5 months and seven rounds of negotiations, China and the US completed an agreement on November 9th, 2005. In Brief, this agreement lasts until through 2008 and covers more than 30 individual products and contains quotas that begin at low levels, but that grow over the next three years. Nineteen of the thirty-four products covered are currently covered by safeguards and the rest fifteen are not. This paper addresses two empirical puzzles associated with the process of international trade bargaining. The primary puzzle concerns the variable degree to which the EU and the U.S. succeed in terms of the terms of agreement reached respectively. The second puzzle questions the contrast between this episode and China?s accession negotiation when EU obviously got more concessions from China than the U.S. By examining the application of Putnam?s two-level game on this comparative case, this paper hypothesizes that stronger and more single-voiced domestic interest group lobbying as well as less political/security association are more likely to result in an agreement in favor of the developed countries. When extending Putnam?s theoretical framework to the case of China, it suggests that the lack of a credible ?tied-hand? domestically due to the unique pattern and functioning of interest group lobbying and the lack of a valid congressional constraints in China makes its negotiators more difficult to ask for more concessions from its democratic counterparts.

External Market Access and Domestic Political Stability: Historical Relationship between International Trade Integration and Domestic Political Regimes

The Politics of U.S.-China Trade Dispute over Intellectual Property Rights and Its Impact on International Trade Institutions