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Everything but Trade: How a Protectionist House of Representatives Passed the United States-Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement |
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Abstract:
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The ratification of CAFTA by the United States House of Representatives presents a situation in which supporters overcame an increasingly protectionist political climate in order to gain approbation. While interest groups frequently influence the politics of trade policy in the direction of protectionism, CAFTA represents a puzzle because the majority of defensive interests lost. This paper applies Christina Daviss theory of institutionalized cross-sector linkages to Robert Putnams Level II negotiations to show how issue linkages and appropriations payoffs can overcome defensive interests opposed to free trade agreements. With the agreement initially thirty to forty votes short of ratification, CAFTA supporters combined the influence of the presidency with the appropriations and legislative power of the House leadership to shift members win sets and achieve ratification. |
Most Common Document Word Stems:
trade (195), 2005 (119), cafta (114), interest (113), vote (97), support (79), presid (78), hous (74), agreement (60), congress (60), member (59), retriev (57), 2006 (56), polit (54), juli (50), p (47), issu (46), polici (42), negoti (40), bush (40), free (39), |
Author's Keywords:
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CAFTA, CAFTA-DR, DR-CAFTA, Central American Free Trade Agreement, Christina Davis, Robert Putnam |
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Association:
Name: International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention URL: http://www.isanet.org
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Jergens, Collin. "Everything but Trade: How a Protectionist House of Representatives Passed the United States-Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007 <Not Available>. 2009-05-24 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180517_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Jergens, C. T. , 2007-02-28 "Everything but Trade: How a Protectionist House of Representatives Passed the United States-Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-05-24 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180517_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: The ratification of CAFTA by the United States House of Representatives presents a situation in which supporters overcame an increasingly protectionist political climate in order to gain approbation. While interest groups frequently influence the politics of trade policy in the direction of protectionism, CAFTA represents a puzzle because the majority of defensive interests lost. This paper applies Christina Daviss theory of institutionalized cross-sector linkages to Robert Putnams Level II negotiations to show how issue linkages and appropriations payoffs can overcome defensive interests opposed to free trade agreements. With the agreement initially thirty to forty votes short of ratification, CAFTA supporters combined the influence of the presidency with the appropriations and legislative power of the House leadership to shift members win sets and achieve ratification. |
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| Document Type: |
application/pdf |
| Page count: |
45 |
| Word count: |
12451 |
| Text sample: |
| Everything but Trade: How a Protectionist House of Representatives Passed the United States- Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement Prepared for Presentation at the International Studies Association Conference March 1 2007 Chicago Illinois “I am flat out completely horizontally opposed to CAFTA.” Rep. Robin Hayes (R-NC) just weeks before casting a decisive vote in favor of the agreement. Collin Jergens Communication Culture and Technology Program Georgetown University 2 Abstract The ratification of CAFTA by the United States House of |
| Post. Retrieved April 15 2006 from LexisNexis Academic. Weisman Jonathan. (2005 July 21). Administration Trying to Build CAFTA Majority Vote by Vote; Clash in House With Democrats Takes On Added Status. The Washington Post. Retrieved April 15 2006 from LexisNexis Academic. White Gregory W. (2005). Free Trade as a Strategic Instrument in the War on Terror?: The 2004 US-Moroccan Free Trade Agreement [Electronic version]. The Middle East Journal. 59:4 597-616. Wood B. Dan and Waterman Richard W. (1994). Bureaucratic |
Similar Titles:
Public Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest or Sociotropic Politics?
Playing the Wedge Issue Card in a Polarized Congress: Vote-switching over China Trade Policy, 1990-2001
CAFTA Politics: Civil Society Participation in Central American Free Trade Negotiations
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