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Association: Name: International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180795_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Steinberg, David. "Farmers versus Financiers: Logrolling and the Political Economy of Exchange Rate Overvaluation in Developing Countries" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007 <Not Available>. 2009-05-24 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180795_index.html>

Steinberg, D. A. , 2007-02-28 "Farmers versus Financiers: Logrolling and the Political Economy of Exchange Rate Overvaluation in Developing Countries" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA Online <PDF>. 2009-05-24 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180795_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: Scholars have paid limited attention to the political causes of exchange rate valuation. Existing theories do not adequately explain why overvalued currencies have been so common in developing countries. Overvaluation is a puzzling outcome: it contradicts the common assumption that states want to maximize net exports; and it has harmful economic effects, such as low growth and financial crises. I argue that previous theories under-predict the prevalence of overvaluation because they have overlooked one important motive for this policy�logrolling. Fixed exchange rates and high government spending typically coincide with overvaluation, and some tradable producers benefit more from these policies than they lose from overvaluation. Thus, they have an incentive to logroll and strategically support overvaluation. The likelihood of logrolling, and thus overvaluation, depends on whether policy promises are credible or not. Logrolling is subject to credibility problems, which are easier to solve when there are multiple veto points in the political system. I predict that the interaction between veto points and sector size best explains patterns of currency valuation in the developing world. Previous analysts have used the exchange rate regime as a proxy for currency valuation, but I use the black market exchange rate premium and the Dollar index, which are more valid measures of currency valuation. Statistical tests, based on a large sample of developing countries from 1974-1995, reveal that the financial sector is associated with overvaluation in cases where there are multiple veto points, and the agricultural industry reduces overvaluation only when there are few veto points.

The Political Economy of Sectoral Exchange Rate Preferences and Lobbying: Germany from 1960-2007, and Beyond

The Overvaluation Puzzle: Sectoral Logrolling and the Political Economy of Exchange Rate Valuation

A Survey of Preferences and Political Activity on Exchange Rate Policy