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Association: Name: International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180987_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Jung, Jai Kwan. "The Paradox of Institution Building After Civil War: A Trade-off Between Short-term Peacemaking and Long-term Democracy Building" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007 <Not Available>. 2009-05-24 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180987_index.html>

Jung, J. , 2007-02-28 "The Paradox of Institution Building After Civil War: A Trade-off Between Short-term Peacemaking and Long-term Democracy Building" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA Online <PDF>. 2009-05-24 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p180987_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: Civil war studies have shown that power sharing is a most effective institutional mechanism for negotiated settlements to intrastate wars and for durable peace after the conflict. However, maintaining peace through power sharing has not necessary led to successful post-civil war democratization. Out of 77 countries that experienced at least one civil war onset between 1945 and 2004, only 9 countries can be classified as successful cases of post-war democracy building that have not backslid into authoritarianism within 10 years after the transition to democracy. This paper thus explores the causes of the success or failure of post-civil war democratization. In particular, it examines how institutional design after civil war shapes the path toward short-term peacemaking and long-term prospects for establishing democratic governance in deeply divided societies. I propose a theory of trade-offs between ending civil wars immediately through rigid power sharing and increasing chances for post-war democratization through democratically adaptable institutional design. Short-term benefits from peacemaking and long-term interests in democracy building do not always correspond to each other and in fact often conflict, depending upon the time horizons held by key actors involved in institutional design at the time of ceasefire. Rigid power sharing is more likely to maintain the stability of post-conflict political regime but locks in many political problems to be resolved during post-conflict reconstruction, thereby being less likely to lead to democracy in the long run. Thus, the paradox of institution building occurs when key actors stick to a short-term solution in the processes of peacemaking and democracy building after civil war. Using discrete time duration models, I test this theoretical expectation with newly collected data on post-civil war political institutions and democratic transitions in countries emerging from the deadly conflict in 1945-2004.

Consociational Democracy and Postconflict Peace. Will Power-Sharing Institutions Increase the Probability of Lasting Peace after Civil War?

Unequal Burdens: Power Sharing Institutions and Post-Civil War Conflict Management