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Association: Name: International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p181032_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Lai, Brian. and Cherry, Mathew. "Reputation and Reliability: Upholding Commitments for the Future" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007 <Not Available>. 2009-05-24 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p181032_index.html>

Lai, B. and Cherry, M. , 2007-02-28 "Reputation and Reliability: Upholding Commitments for the Future" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-05-24 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p181032_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: Why do states uphold their alliance commitments? Most research has focused on characteristics of the state (like regime type) or dyadic/alliance level factors (like changes in relative power between the members of the alliance). One understudied effect is the role of other alliances held by a state. When a state faces the decision to uphold an alliance commitment during a conflict, its decision is likely to have reprecussions with other states, who are not involved in the immediate conflict but have an alliance tie with the deciding state. These additional alliance ties are likely to create incentives to uphold an agreement that less encumbered states are likely to possess. States with additional alliances are likely to worry about the future costs for reneging on an alliance, especially the possibility of increased aggression against other allies. Thus, this paper hypothesizes that states are more likely to uphold their alliance commitments when they are members of other alliances with similar commitments. This argument is tested on a set of alliance commitment choices from 1816-1992, controlling for other factors and possible selection effects. Results are supportive of the effect of reputation on whether a state upholds its alliance commitment.

The Influence of Campaign Contributions on the Content and Passage of Legislation: Modeling Effects of Campaign Costs, Partisan Strength and Institutional Design in State Legislative Chambers

Power, Institutional Structure, and the Effect of Formal Military Alliances on State Behavior: A Hierarchical Model, 1815-2003

How to Count Parties: Estimation of Models with Effective Number of Parties as Dependent Variables