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Association: Name: International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p181130_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Civelekoglu, Ilke. "Governments and Central Banks in the Age of Financial Liberalization: What Brings an Institutional Change in the Status of Central Banks in Emerging Markets?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007 <Not Available>. 2009-05-24 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p181130_index.html>

Civelekoglu, I. , 2007-02-28 "Governments and Central Banks in the Age of Financial Liberalization: What Brings an Institutional Change in the Status of Central Banks in Emerging Markets?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA <Not Available>. 2009-05-24 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p181130_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: When international financial institutions and advanced capitalist countries threw their support for financial liberalization in rest of the world, the expectation was that the ?threat of exit? by internationally mobile capital would make the governments susceptible to capital market pressures. Accordingly, in a world where the global financial market actors can quickly and easily penalize the national governments, when those governments employ economic policies distasteful to them, the value of central bank(CB)independence would increase significantly in emerging markets as a signal of their ?creditworthiness? to potential investors. However, in many developing countries the structural transformation in the status of the CB did not realize. This paper will respond to the question of ?Under what conditions does financial liberalization lead to a change in the status of CB in favor of institutional autonomy?? by tracing the roots of politicians` institutional choices to the structural conditions that those politicians operate under. In the paper I will argue that change in the status of a particular monetary institution- whether the CB should be ceded autonomy- is contingent upon 1- the degree of distributional conflicts arising from the liberalization process, and 2-the party system of the country in question. By exploring the cases of Turkey and Argentine between 1980-2000, the paper will argue that in an age of financial liberalization, the politicians who were ruling in a highly competitive and fragmented political system, and who were experiencing severe distributional conflicts among different segments of the society resisted structural transformation in the status of the CB since it was too costly for their political survival. An autonomous CB, which views policy through the lens of macroeconomic stability is to resist policies that result in excess spending, loose monetary policy, and high inflation. As the paper will highlight, by establishing a monetary regime where such populist policies are off the agenda, ruling politicians would tie their own hands by setting up powerful constraints over the types of policies that they want to pursue for electoral purposes. The paper will claim that in such a context, structural change in the status of a CB could come only through an exogenous shock as in the form of a severe economic crisis, given the heavy costs involved in transformation. A brief analysis of the most recent crisis in Turkey will be discussed to support this argument.Methodologically, the paper will employ qualitative tools in its analysis. All recent arguments on CB literature are formulated by game theory approach and mathematically complex formal models. Unfortunately, they do not offer many insights to understand the causality that lead to presence/lack of an institutional transformation in a domestic setting. By using process-tracing method, the paper aims to fill a gap in current literature and demonstrate why the political outcomes occur the way they do.To sum up, the paper sets itself the task of bringing a persuasive theoretical explanation of conditions and terms of institutional change in CBs for the scholars who engage themselves with the question of how to brighten the prospects of economic well-being in emerging markets in this age of financial liberalization.

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