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Association: Name: International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p181265_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Gupta, Surupa. "The Institutional Basis of India?s Defensive Position on Agricultural Trade Policy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28, 2007 <Not Available>. 2009-05-24 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p181265_index.html>

Gupta, S. , 2007-02-28 "The Institutional Basis of India?s Defensive Position on Agricultural Trade Policy" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA <Not Available>. 2009-05-24 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p181265_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: This paper analyzes trade policymaking in India in the context of the ongoing negotiations on trade in agriculture at the WTO. During the past decade, the overall direction of India's trade policy has become more liberal. However, India's position on liberalization of trade in agriculture at multilateral trade negotiations is dominated by its defensive/protectionist interests expressed in terms of a focus on livelihood security rather than its aggressive/liberal interests in gaining market access. This presents a puzzle for existing trade theory which would expect India's farm trade policy to be more liberal, given that about 80% of India's farm prices are globally competitive. This paper adopts an institutional perspective, and argues that the policy is ultimately a product of the existing domestic agricultural policies and the new consultative trade policy-making apparatus. Reform of existing policies has proved difficult and the Ministry of Agriculture resists liberalization because it sees itself primarily as a protector of farmers' interests. At the same time, the government has changed the institutions for making trade policy since 1998, giving the protectionist Ministry of Agriculture greater voice in decisions at the expense of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The former has often vetoed more liberal positions advocated by the Commerce Ministry. The Parliament, unlike in the west, plays a minor role in setting the tone of the policy since its ratification is not required. Moreover, although in India's federal system state governments could have used their power to shape policy, they have not organized politically to press for liberalization, instead supporting the protectionist views espoused by the agriculture ministry.This paper also shows that conventional institution-based explanations of trade policy, mainly based on the US and West European experience, need to be modified when being applied to developing countries like India. For example, institutional theories suggest an association between democracies and liberal trade policies, but this case shows that democracies can sometimes be more protectionist. Discussions of the role of bureaucracies focus on the relation between bureaucratic autonomy and trade liberalization. However, some relevant bureaucracies are not autonomous, and some autonomous bureaucracies may not support liberalization. This research suggests that bureaucracies should not be treated as unitary actors.

Protecting the half-billion: Domestic and international determinants of India’s agricultural trade policy at the WTO negotiations

The Impact of Policy Networks in Agricultural Trade Liberalization During the Uruguay and Doha Rounds: The Role of Ideas, Interests and Institutions