Author's Keywords: alliances, moral hazard, institutional design	Convention Submission, Review, and Scheduling! All Academic Convention can help with all of your abstract management needs and many more. Contact us today for a quote! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209187_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Lai, Brian. "Reducing the Effects of Moral Hazard: Institutional Designs Within International Alliances" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2009-05-27 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209187_index.html>

Lai, B. , 2007-08-30 "Reducing the Effects of Moral Hazard: Institutional Designs Within International Alliances" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-05-27 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p209187_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: What explains the level of commitment within an international military alliance? Specifically, when do alliances choose to adopt active military support for offensive uses of force versus lower levels of commitment? Drawing on the rational design of international institutions literature, this paper argues that the choice of commitment is a conscious effort to address two competing problems. The first is the potential for entrapment. Allies worry that commitments may lead other member states to act in a risky fashion, creating unnecessary conflict. The other problem is the need to demonstrate commitment in order to maximize the bargaining power of the member states. The former problem leads allies to choose lower levels of commitment like defense pacts in order to signal to alliance members what types of behaviors are acceptable. Conversely, the latter problem encourages states to make broader obligations about when they will use force. Empirically, concern for moral hazard should be more likely when there are power disparities amongst members within an alliance. Greater levels of threat facing alliance members should lead states to favor maximizing their commitments. These two arguments are tested empirically on all alliances from 1816-1992 with results supporting both conjectures.

State Participation in International Institutions I: State Support to Human Rights Norms

Power, Institutional Structure, and the Effect of Formal Military Alliances on State Behavior: A Hierarchical Model, 1815-2003