Author's Keywords: International Trade, Alliance Commitment Problem	Convention Submission, Review, and Scheduling! All Academic Convention can help with all of your abstract management needs and many more. Contact us today for a quote! Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p210697_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Kagotani, Koji. "Economic Interdependence and Alliance Reliability: How does International Trade Affect Alliance Commitments in Crises?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2009-05-27 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p210697_index.html>

Kagotani, K. , 2007-08-30 "Economic Interdependence and Alliance Reliability: How does International Trade Affect Alliance Commitments in Crises?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <PDF>. 2009-05-27 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p210697_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: This paper investigates economic interdependence and alliance reliability. I explain how international trade affects the violation of alliance commitments in crises. Trade has both an endogenous and exogenous nature. Trade flows are affected by security concerns, while trade generates domestic political cleavages that constrain governmental policy choices. I interpret trade sensitivity and vulnerability focusing on governmental incentives, the general interest and special interest models. With statistical methods, I examine whether trade affected by security concerns generates domestic political cleavages in the period 1816-1944 that, in turn, affect alliance violations. The results do not sufficiently answer the research question. However, the results do provide a very clear policy implication. A state�s vulnerability to trade decreases its rate of treaty violation. Controlling bilateral trade and establishing preferential trade agreements are helpful for constraining alliance commitment violations. Though there is a lack of economic data on trade for the period under examination, imputation techniques allow us to arrive at robust results. This paper opens up a new interesting research area on the interaction between trade and security.

Whither the Internationalist Coalition in American foreign Policy? The Domestic Politics of International Trade and Foreign Aid Policy, 1980-2006

Power and its Constraint under Globalization: Interaction and Interdependency among the Chinese Labor, State and the US Market Actors through International Political Economic Connections