Author's Keywords: Civil war, power sharing, political institutions, and post-civil war democratization	Convention All Academic Convention makes running your annual conference simple and cost effective. It is your online solution for abstract management, peer review, and scheduling for your annual meeting or convention. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p211012_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Jung, Jai Kwan. "The Paradox of Institution Building after Civil War: A Trade-off between Short-term Peacemaking and Long-term Democracy Building" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2009-05-27 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p211012_index.html>

Jung, J. , 2007-08-30 "The Paradox of Institution Building after Civil War: A Trade-off between Short-term Peacemaking and Long-term Democracy Building" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-05-27 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p211012_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: What causes the success or failure of democratization in post-civil war societies? In particular, how does post-conflict institutional design influence both short-term peacemaking and long-term prospects for democratic governance? This paper argues that in countries emerging from deadly internal conflict, political institutions well designed to end civil war are not necessarily as effective for promoting democratic governance. There is a trade-off between the short-term interest in ending civil war as quickly as possible through power-sharing arrangements and the long-term goal of democracy promotion: power sharing does contribute to negotiated settlement to civil war through institutionally guaranteeing the security of warring parties, but it is less conducive to establishing democracy in the long run due to its tendency to lock war-induced cleavages into post-war political structures. The paper tests this central hypothesis through a series of event history analysis of 75 post-civil war countries in 1946-2002.

Grafting participatory governance onto representative democracy and existing state institutions: Explaining outcomes via political society and civil society lenses

Consociational Democracy and Postconflict Peace. Will Power-Sharing Institutions Increase the Probability of Lasting Peace after Civil War?