|
|
|
|
Ties That Do Not Bind: Why Treaty Ratification Might Imply Treaty Non-Compliance |
|
| Abstract | Word Stems | Keywords | Association | Citation | Get this Document | Similar Titles |
|
STOP!
You can now view the document associated with this citation by clicking on the "View Document as HTML" link below. |
|
Click here to view the document
|
Abstract:
|
There is a general expectation that states will comply with the provisions set forth
in treaties that they ratify. However, we know that a compliance gap exists and that
countries sometimes do not fully incorporate or implement international treaties to
which they formally are party. We look inside the state to suggest a domestic politics
explanation for these outcomes. Using a formal model, we find equilibria in which
states will sign and ratify treaties but then either not incorporate them into domestic
legal codes or else implement them in a sub-standard fashion. The model suggests three
behaviors that can limit treaty implementation: buck-passing, hand-showing and the
fear of compliance failure. We illustrate these behaviors with reference to case studies
involving the United States, India and Russia. |
Most Common Document Word Stems:
treati (255), chamber (137), implement (133), execut (109), rati (104), upper (81), 1 (74), actor (73), sign (72), 2 (69), complianc (62), lower (62), cation (62), polici (60), voter (59), state (57), point (56), vote (56), prefer (54), xm (53), x (53), |
|
 | Convention | | All Academic Convention is the premier solution for your association's abstract management solutions needs. |  | Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. |  | Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! |  | Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! |  | Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. |  | Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! |  | Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! | | Click here for more information. |
|
|
Association:
Name: American Political Science Association
URL: http://www.apsanet.org
|
Citation:
|
MLA Citation:
| Sanchez, Thania. and Winters, Matthew. "Ties That Do Not Bind: Why Treaty Ratification Might Imply Treaty Non-Compliance" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2009-05-27 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p211077_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Sanchez, T. and Winters, M. S. , 2007-08-30 "Ties That Do Not Bind: Why Treaty Ratification Might Imply Treaty Non-Compliance" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-05-27 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p211077_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: There is a general expectation that states will comply with the provisions set forth
in treaties that they ratify. However, we know that a compliance gap exists and that
countries sometimes do not fully incorporate or implement international treaties to
which they formally are party. We look inside the state to suggest a domestic politics
explanation for these outcomes. Using a formal model, we find equilibria in which
states will sign and ratify treaties but then either not incorporate them into domestic
legal codes or else implement them in a sub-standard fashion. The model suggests three
behaviors that can limit treaty implementation: buck-passing, hand-showing and the
fear of compliance failure. We illustrate these behaviors with reference to case studies
involving the United States, India and Russia. |
Get this Document:
Find this citation or document at one or all of these locations below. The links below may have the citation or the entire document for free or you may purchase access to the document. Clicking on these links will change the site you're on and empty your shopping cart.
| Document Type: |
application/pdf |
| Page count: |
38 |
| Word count: |
13487 |
| Text sample: |
| Ties That Do Not Bind: A Model of Treaty Ratification and Compliance Thania Sanchez Columbia University ts2058@columbia.edu Matthew S. Winters Columbia University msw22@columbia.edu August 2007 Paper prepared for presentation at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Chicago Illinois Abstract There is a general expectation that states will comply with the provisions set forth in treaties that they ratify. However we know that a compliance gap exists and that countries sometimes do not fully incorporate or |
| chamber will vote in favor of the treaty if ˆ p2 ≤ (xM − xSQ )2 (from equations (2) and (3)). The executive’s decision is based on whether the condition p(xT − xM ) − b ≤ (xM − xSQ )2 (from equation (5)) holds. Given that the RHS is the same in both of these conditions if the parameters are such that p2 < p(xT − xM ) − b ∗ ∗ then we will have a situation |
Similar Titles:
Linking Popular Preferences toPublic Policy: Median Voters, Median Parties, and Central GovernmentSize
Measuring Multilateralism: Ideal Point Estimates of State Preferences over Global Treaties
|
|
