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Association: Name: American Political Science Association URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p211180_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Bloom, Mia. "Missing Their Mark: The IRA?s Failed "Human Bomb" Campaign" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2009-05-27 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p211180_index.html>

Bloom, M. M. , 2007-08-30 "Missing Their Mark: The IRA?s Failed "Human Bomb" Campaign" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-05-27 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p211180_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: A plausible assumption for most observers of terrorist movements is that such groupings, given their tendency to frequently operate outside of societal norms, are relatively immune to the vicissitudes and pressures of public opinion. In fact, most terrorist movements, like political parties, are ultimately power seeking, perceiving themselves as the future leaders of their respective community. This is particularly the case when the conflict in question relates to ethno-religious and territorial disputes. Following from Mao�s theory of the �Fishes and the Sea,� terrorists live within and operate according to certain parameters of the public and, for reasons explored in this paper, are both cognizant of and susceptible to how they are perceived by members of their ethnic/religious community, rival groups, as well as international public opinion. This sensitivity to public support occasionally means that when the terrorists engage in tactics or strategies that are perceived to be more radical or violent than that which their publics have become used to tolerating, the movement risks the consequences of backlash. It thus would seem to follow that terrorists may be circumscribed in the kinds of strategies they can pursue and the immediate tactical methods they can deploy. One such example is the IRA�s failed �human bomb� campaign of 1990, often referred to as the �proxy bomb� campaign, and sometimes misleadingly referred to as the IRA�s �suicide bomb� campaign. The particular operations that came to typify this activity during the IRA�s campaign of terrorism throughout the Troubles involved the kidnapping at gunpoint of several Catholics (not members of the IRA), with victims being subsequently coerced to drive vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) into military targets. In some cases, the victim�s family would be held at gunpoint until completion of the operation. A little explored feature of the proxy bomb attacks is that public opinion against the IRA, even from within the broader Republican community, was so negative that the IRA quickly discontinued the use of the tactic. While the reasons behind both the execution and discontinuation of the proxy bomb campaign are still poorly understood, the IRA is one of the few historical cases we have in which the use of human bombs (albeit of one particular type here) failed in a strategic sense due to the limits of public sensibilities and a lack of tolerance for targeting civilians in this particular way.

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Force Protection, Military Accountability, and the Response of Civilian Leadership: Culpability for the Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Military Forces Abroad