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Have You No Shame? The Normative Sources of Weak Actor Influence

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Abstract:

Why, and under what conditions, can weak actors influence the behavior of the strong? Traditional IR theory avers that capabilities dictate outcomes. Yet, despite the hypothesized, inevitable consequences of such power asymmetries, sometimes, to paraphrase Thucydides, the weak succeed in doing what they can, not simply suffering what they must (e.g., Mack 1978; Arreguin-Toft 2001, 2005; Greenhill 2002, forthcoming). One method whereby weak actors effectively exercise influence is by harnessing the power of norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Under certain conditions, weak actors can turn the virtues of the powerful against them, by exposing the distance between what they say and what they do and thereby imposing on them what one scholar has termed "hypocrisy costs" (Greenhill 2002, 2004, forthcoming). However, strong actors vary in the degree to which they make themselves vulnerable to rhetorical entrapment. Moreover, different constellations of interest group mobilization can make strong actors more or less susceptible to weak actor influence. One of our central claims is that strong actors are especially vulnerable to weak actor influence when the strong actor has made many statements in support of a norm (“high rhetorical entrapment”) and both pro-norm and anti-norm advocates are mobilized to impose high political costs.

In this paper, we use comparative case study analysis to demonstrate that different combinations of rhetorical entrapment and interest group mobilization can explain when weak actors have influence over the strong. The cases we study include NGO campaigns for the International Criminal Court, focusing on the policies of two hard cases, France and the United States. We also study two migration cases where weak actors (Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti and Erich Honecker of East Germany) successfully used pro-human rights norms and the strategic threat of migration to coerce stronger powers (the United States and West Germany, respectively). In the conclusion, we outline the further implications of the argument, including what it has to say about outcomes in additional norms-charged issue areas, such as funding of anti-retroviral drugs and the treatment of detainees at Guantánamo Bay Naval Station.

Author's Keywords:

norms, immigration, International Criminal Court, weak actors, social movements, foreign policy, hypocrisy costs, rhetorical entrapment
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Name: American Political Science Association
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MLA Citation:

Busby, Joshua. and Greenhill, Kelly. "Have You No Shame? The Normative Sources of Weak Actor Influence" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2010-01-24 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p212109_index.html>

APA Citation:

Busby, J. and Greenhill, K. M. , 2007-08-30 "Have You No Shame? The Normative Sources of Weak Actor Influence" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL <Not Available>. 2010-01-24 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p212109_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Why, and under what conditions, can weak actors influence the behavior of the strong? Traditional IR theory avers that capabilities dictate outcomes. Yet, despite the hypothesized, inevitable consequences of such power asymmetries, sometimes, to paraphrase Thucydides, the weak succeed in doing what they can, not simply suffering what they must (e.g., Mack 1978; Arreguin-Toft 2001, 2005; Greenhill 2002, forthcoming). One method whereby weak actors effectively exercise influence is by harnessing the power of norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Under certain conditions, weak actors can turn the virtues of the powerful against them, by exposing the distance between what they say and what they do and thereby imposing on them what one scholar has termed "hypocrisy costs" (Greenhill 2002, 2004, forthcoming). However, strong actors vary in the degree to which they make themselves vulnerable to rhetorical entrapment. Moreover, different constellations of interest group mobilization can make strong actors more or less susceptible to weak actor influence. One of our central claims is that strong actors are especially vulnerable to weak actor influence when the strong actor has made many statements in support of a norm (“high rhetorical entrapment”) and both pro-norm and anti-norm advocates are mobilized to impose high political costs.

In this paper, we use comparative case study analysis to demonstrate that different combinations of rhetorical entrapment and interest group mobilization can explain when weak actors have influence over the strong. The cases we study include NGO campaigns for the International Criminal Court, focusing on the policies of two hard cases, France and the United States. We also study two migration cases where weak actors (Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti and Erich Honecker of East Germany) successfully used pro-human rights norms and the strategic threat of migration to coerce stronger powers (the United States and West Germany, respectively). In the conclusion, we outline the further implications of the argument, including what it has to say about outcomes in additional norms-charged issue areas, such as funding of anti-retroviral drugs and the treatment of detainees at Guantánamo Bay Naval Station.

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