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Between Balancing and Bandwagoning: A Game Theoretic Analysis of ASEAN's China Policy in the Post-Cold War Era
Unformatted Document Text:  As a result, ASEAN is more like an instrument to facilitate its member states’ self-interests. But ASEAN states would rarely allow ASEAN to constrain their self-interested behaviors (Narine 2002, 5). In other words, ASEAN has to work for its member states’ interests, but its member states are not expected to sacrifice their self-interests in exchange for the interests of ASEAN as a whole. In terms of ASEAN’s decision-making mechanism, the ASEAN states reach decision by consultation and consensus, emphasizing the value of self-restraint and disdaining majority rule. Hence, only the issue that is accepted by all can become ASEAN’s official policy (Haacke 2003). These norms and the features of ASEAN’s decision-making are critically important for several reasons. First, the priority of its member states’ sovereignty leaves the door open for each member state to pursue its self-interests. That self-interested behavior by its member states is justified and legitimate. Second, any ASEAN’s decision cannot contradict any ASEAN state’s interest; otherwise that decision will not become ASEAN’s collective decision and cannot represent ASEAN’s collective position. It suggests that if the ASEAN states have different opinions, the minority states have veto power. In this case, the only way to resolve this divergence is to go through continuingly consultations between the member states to seek mutually acceptable resolution. Third, the preceding features of decision-making is more likely to lead to the result that only the lower-salient and less controversial issues have a higher likelihood that ASEAN can reach consensus, compared with that of higher-sensitive issues. Two major reasons attribute to this phenomenon: (1) Lack of majority rule and (2) only the resolution that is acceptable for all prevails. As a result, it is difficult for ASEAN to reach consensus on important issues. 11 11 Narine (2002) claims that Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia exposed this weakness. See Narine, Shaun. 2002. Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner 11

Authors: Chiou, Yi-hung. and Song, Young Hoon.
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As a result, ASEAN is more like an instrument to facilitate its member states’
self-interests. But ASEAN states would rarely allow ASEAN to constrain their
self-interested behaviors (Narine 2002, 5). In other words, ASEAN has to work for its
member states’ interests, but its member states are not expected to sacrifice their
self-interests in exchange for the interests of ASEAN as a whole.
In terms of ASEAN’s decision-making mechanism, the ASEAN states reach
decision by consultation and consensus, emphasizing the value of self-restraint and
disdaining majority rule. Hence, only the issue that is accepted by all can become
ASEAN’s official policy (Haacke 2003). These norms and the features of ASEAN’s
decision-making are critically important for several reasons. First, the priority of its
member states’ sovereignty leaves the door open for each member state to pursue its
self-interests. That self-interested behavior by its member states is justified and
legitimate. Second, any ASEAN’s decision cannot contradict any ASEAN state’s
interest; otherwise that decision will not become ASEAN’s collective decision and
cannot represent ASEAN’s collective position. It suggests that if the ASEAN states
have different opinions, the minority states have veto power. In this case, the only way
to resolve this divergence is to go through continuingly consultations between the
member states to seek mutually acceptable resolution. Third, the preceding features of
decision-making is more likely to lead to the result that only the lower-salient and less
controversial issues have a higher likelihood that ASEAN can reach consensus,
compared with that of higher-sensitive issues. Two major reasons attribute to this
phenomenon: (1) Lack of majority rule and (2) only the resolution that is acceptable
for all prevails. As a result, it is difficult for ASEAN to reach consensus on important
issues.
11
Narine (2002) claims that Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia exposed this weakness. See Narine,
Shaun. 2002. Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner
11


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