Philippines to conduct joint prospecting for oil and gas in this area (Yuan 2006). It is
the first time that China transforms its “joint development” from words into a
practical action. In a nutshell, above development suggests that the tension between
China and the ASEAN states in this region has greatly reduced. ASEAN seems to
successfully integrate China into its multilateral framework and effectively constrain
China from using force in the disputed area. Nevertheless, this paper argues that
ASEAN’s responses to China’s behaviors in the South China Sea reveal its internal
weakness and its failure to take a more unified position toward China, which led its
member states to adopt hedging policy against China individually.
First, although the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea is viewed
as the ASEAN’s first collective stance on the South China Sea issue, in fact, it was a
“watered-down version of what ASEAN had in mind” (Lee 1999, 25). This toothless
declaration largely reflects the result of the game structure in Figure 6, since one
group of the ASEAN states were strongly opposed to take a tough position against
China on this issue. First, in 1992, the Philippines President Fidel Ramos in his AMM
speech called for an international meeting in search for a solution of the Spratly
dispute.
However, other ASEAN states were concerned about the possibility of
China’s retaliation in the Cambodian issue if they insist on the South China Sea issue.
Therefore, they were reluctant to support the Philippine’s stance. As a result, the 1992
Declaration was only a general statement that repeats the principles of the TAC (Lee
1999). Additionally, China insisted that the South China Sea issue should not be on
the ARF agenda, despite the fact some ASEAN states, such as Malaysia and the
Philippines, did hope to discuss this issue. Eventually, the ARF did not say anything
about the South China Sea disputes. In short, China seems to insist three principles
17
Among ASEAN states, the Philippines has been concerned about China’s ambition in that region,
especially after the U.S. troops withdrew from the Subic and Clark military bases in 1991.
20
Convention