Lenowitz
Obedience at the Time of Necessitá
9
cisely because the state is indissolubly bound up with human existence, its essential law extends
ultimately far beyond the range of anything that can be expressed in terms of rules.”
21
This passage suggests that there are two possible and related problems with relying on
discovered rules: there could be an epistemological problem, in that human reason is simply un-
able to fully understand the rules governing the state and thus what is known is fragmentary or
inaccurate; or the problem could be metaphysical, in that the rules governing the state possess
traits—perhaps they constantly change—which makes systemization impossible. Whatever the
reason, natural law derivations of the state, result in a political system that is far too inflexible for
the endless spontaneity of human existence. Note that this links up with Bonhoeffer’s rejection
of the Reformation tradition, for a self-contained system is a static one in which all contingencies
have been worked out. As we will see, such an inability to adapt to reality, to respond to change,
is a powerful reason for Bonhoeffer to both oppose natural law derivations and seek a way
around his own absolute resistance prohibition.
1.2 Luther and Kant on Resistance and Disobedience: A Summary
In contrast to such an emphasis on flexibility, Luther and Kant discuss state obedience using a
lexicon of absolutes. Disobedience to laws that fall into concrete predetermined categories is
permissible, but resisting the state is never acceptable, regardless of circumstance. In this section,
I summarize the reasons both thinkers give for holding such rigid positions, and point out the
close similarity of their arguments.
Luther and Kant’s conceptions of permissible disobedience are nearly identical.
22
Luther
claims that a citizen can only disobey a particular law if it commands a citizen to do something
clearly evil or against God, or if it falls outside the jurisdiction of the state and attempts to dictate
religious belief. Kant follows Luther precisely, though he substitutes reason for the divine. Thus,
Kant claims, a citizen can disobey a particular command if it directly opposes ethical law or at-
tempts to dictate the motivation behind an action. Both thinkers emphasize that it is only per-
21
Ethics, 224.
22
This similarity between Luther and Kant’s resistance prohibition is striking, and seems to map onto a deeper
similarity between the two thinkers, but one that I cannot pursue within the confines of this paper. Some
would claim that the two resistance arguments are more similar than I have characterized, in that Kant and
Luther share the same priority of freeing and purifying the human soul for God. Ian Hunter, for example, pro-
vocatively portrays Kant and other German Enlightenment metaphysicians as apologists formulating a new
type of Lutheranism in response to sophisticated arguments deployed by their secular competitors. See Ian
Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
Convention