Leymon 4
a possibility to limit the influence of what they perceived as discriminatory judges (Doob, 2000; Van
Voorhis, Cullen, and Applegate, 1995). Possibly limiting racial and ethnic disparities in imprisonment
Savelsberg (1992) argues that sentencing guidelines (this may also apply to determinate sentencing
and statutory presumptive sentencing as well) are an ideal representation of what Weber refers to as
formal rationality; indeterminate sentencing, conversely, is a form of substantive rationality. Both
sentencing procedures are rational as defined by Weber (1978) as they are based in law, giving the
procedures “legalized” validity, but they differ in the application of the laws. Substantive rationality is a
type of decision-making, which is subject to values and an appeal to ethical norms and does not take into
consideration the nature of outcomes. Weber further suggests that technologically advanced societies will
actively shift all decision making to a bureaucratically defined formal rationality that removes subjective
values by stressing a technical orientation to procedural process. These processes are established in well-
defined criteria designed to elicit a specific outcome. "The judge . . . is more or less an automaton of
paragraphs: the legal documents, together with the costs and fees, are dropped in at the top with the
expectation that the judgment will emerge at the bottom, together with more or less sound arguments - an
apparatus, accordingly, whose functioning is by and large calculable or predictable (Weber, 1978: 1395).”
Sentencing guidelines usually consist of a matrix of possible sentences with very narrow ranges
within a sentencing category that are defined by an offender’s criminal history (prior offenses) and
offense severity. In most cases a judge can only deviate from this prescription by providing a written
explanation of the reasons why he or she would do so (recent Supreme Court decisions have called this
procedure into question). Met with immediate disapproval from judges, who felt they had lost their
power to fit the offense with appropriate sentences, legislators passed such legislation largely without the
support of the courts (Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000; Kempf-Leonard and Sample, 2001). Research
has indicated that on average judges comply with the guidelines 85% of the time, meeting the goals set
forth by sentencing reform commissions and removing discretion from the judge’s hands (Marvell, 1995).
It is important to note that while sentencing guidelines were established in each state under the same
general principles, guidelines’ design and implementation have varied from state to state. A general
Convention