Citation

Getting a Seat at the IMF Executive Board Table: Strategic, Economic, or Bureaucratic Politics?

Abstract | Word Stems | Keywords | Association | Citation | Get this Document | Similar Titles




STOP!

You can now view the document associated with this citation by clicking on the "View Document as HTML" link below.

View Document as HTML:
Click here to view the document

Abstract:

How are seats allocated on the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Executive Board? Are seats determined by strategic power politics, as realists would contend; by economic and class interests, as critical theorists would argue; or by bureaucratic considerations, as organizational theorists would insist? The theoretical debate on this issue is lively, with hypothesizing taking place on every front. What is sorely lacking, however, is empirical evidence of actual practice. Developing an evidence-based understanding of the manner in which IMF member states gain access to seats at the Executive Board is particularly crucial now, given the centrality of this issue to current debates about the very future of the IMF itself. As part of a multi-case study, this paper will present historical context to this current policy dilemma, illustrating the political process involved in getting a seat at the Executive Board. This research will also build methodological bridges between the various theoretical paradigms used to examine decision-making bodies in international organizations. The core of the project will be an analysis of the process of IMF Executive Board seat allocation, with special focus on four countries that have gained seats since the late 1970s: Saudi Arabia (1978), China (1980), Russia (1992), and Switzerland (1992). The addition of these particular seats expanded the IMF Executive Board from the 20 mandated by the IMF’s Articles of Agreement to its current 24 seat composition. Why did the IMF Executive Board expand beyond its mandated number to include these members? Through a rigorous comparative political-historical analysis, this study will put the IMF’s technical, rules-based argument for how seats are allocated to the test. The project uses content-analysis of the IMF’s own internal Archive documents (including Executive Board minutes, staff technical studies, and Board decisions); of declassified US government documents acquired using Freedom of Information Act requests from the State and Treasury Departments, and of transcripts of personal interviews with IMF staff, Executive Directors, US officials, other governments’ officials, and policy insiders.

Most Common Document Word Stems:

imf (236), quota (186), board (184), swiss (179), seat (141), execut (133), staff (96), switzerland (95), fund (94), would (93), russia (90), intern (86), member (83), state (72), director (65), us (61), membership (59), washington (51), polit (50), russian (49), treasuri (47),
Convention
All Academic Convention can solve the abstract management needs for any association's annual meeting.
Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf.Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets!
Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more!Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering.
Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more!Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches!
Click here for more information.

Association:
Name: ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES
URL:
http://www.isanet.org


Citation:
URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252154_index.html
Direct Link:
HTML Code:

MLA Citation:

Momani, Bessma. "Getting a Seat at the IMF Executive Board Table: Strategic, Economic, or Bureaucratic Politics?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 <Not Available>. 2009-05-23 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252154_index.html>

APA Citation:

Momani, B. , 2008-03-26 "Getting a Seat at the IMF Executive Board Table: Strategic, Economic, or Bureaucratic Politics?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA Online <PDF>. 2009-05-23 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252154_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: How are seats allocated on the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Executive Board? Are seats determined by strategic power politics, as realists would contend; by economic and class interests, as critical theorists would argue; or by bureaucratic considerations, as organizational theorists would insist? The theoretical debate on this issue is lively, with hypothesizing taking place on every front. What is sorely lacking, however, is empirical evidence of actual practice. Developing an evidence-based understanding of the manner in which IMF member states gain access to seats at the Executive Board is particularly crucial now, given the centrality of this issue to current debates about the very future of the IMF itself. As part of a multi-case study, this paper will present historical context to this current policy dilemma, illustrating the political process involved in getting a seat at the Executive Board. This research will also build methodological bridges between the various theoretical paradigms used to examine decision-making bodies in international organizations. The core of the project will be an analysis of the process of IMF Executive Board seat allocation, with special focus on four countries that have gained seats since the late 1970s: Saudi Arabia (1978), China (1980), Russia (1992), and Switzerland (1992). The addition of these particular seats expanded the IMF Executive Board from the 20 mandated by the IMF’s Articles of Agreement to its current 24 seat composition. Why did the IMF Executive Board expand beyond its mandated number to include these members? Through a rigorous comparative political-historical analysis, this study will put the IMF’s technical, rules-based argument for how seats are allocated to the test. The project uses content-analysis of the IMF’s own internal Archive documents (including Executive Board minutes, staff technical studies, and Board decisions); of declassified US government documents acquired using Freedom of Information Act requests from the State and Treasury Departments, and of transcripts of personal interviews with IMF staff, Executive Directors, US officials, other governments’ officials, and policy insiders.

Get this Document:

Find this citation or document at one or all of these locations below. The links below may have the citation or the entire document for free or you may purchase access to the document. Clicking on these links will change the site you're on and empty your shopping cart.

Abstract Only All Academic Inc.
Abstract Only ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES
Abstract Only Political Research Online

Document Type: PDF
Page count: 28
Word count: 16961
Text sample:
Title: Getting a Seat at the IMF Executive Board Table By: Bessma Momani Assistant Professor Departments of Political Science and History University of Waterloo Senior Fellow Centre for International Governance and Innovation bmomani@uwaterloo.ca Paper presented to the ISA Annual Conference San Francisco March 2008 Abstract: How are seats allocated on the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Executive Board? Are seats determined by bureaucratic interests strategic power politics or by a combination of the two? The theoretical debate on this issue
many realists do that the IMF staff are pawns of the Executive Board greatly underestimates their intellectual and technical autonomy in the institution. It is clear that there is a need for better appreciation of the impact of the IMF staff’s technocratic character on IMF decision-making. To this end delegation theory indeed provides a useful bridge between the constructivist-rationalist divide. Delegation theory accepts the possibility for autonomous staff behaviour particularly when IO staff are delegated technical tasks but correctly


Similar Titles:
The Politics of Genocide: Comparing International Media Coverage of the Sudanese Conflict in Security Council Permanent Member States

Russia as Virtual State in International Politics

Rights and Roubles: Social, Political and Economic Explanations of Ethnic Russian Repatriation from non-Russian Soviet Successor States


 
All Academic, Inc. is your premier source for research and conference management. Visit our website, www.allacademic.com, to see how we can help you today.