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Association: Name: ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252384_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Barclay, Pascael. "Do Authoritarian Elections Matter? Political Business Cycles in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 <Not Available>. 2009-05-23 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252384_index.html>

Barclay, P. , 2008-03-26 "Do Authoritarian Elections Matter? Political Business Cycles in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA <Not Available>. 2009-05-23 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252384_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: Do elections in authoritarian regimes matter? It is often assumed that they are mere window dressing. Yet it is also possible that these elections have independent effects, which make authoritarian leaders care about the elections, despite their ability to manipulate the results through fraud and repression. One way to discover whether authoritarian elections matter is to examine political business cycles (PBCs) in electoral authoritarian (EA) regimes. This study shows that PBCs occur cross-nationally in authoritarian regimes that hold regular elections, but only when the incumbent faces a challenger. In fact, government consumption increases by .43% in election years in competitive elections. Although this number is small, elections have the largest impact on government spending of the variables included in the model. Also, evidence from case studies portray PBCs in authoritarian regimes as targeted and informal. Therefore, in the case of informal spending, much pre-electoral spending may not be captured by overall government consumption or, in the case of targeted spending, the magnitude of the increase for certain groups will similarly not be captured by this aggregate variable. From the evidence presented in this study, we can conclude that PBCs occur in competitive authoritarian settings, indicating that dictators care about electoral returns.

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