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Missing Their Mark: The IRA Proxy Bomb Campaign of 1990 |
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Abstract:
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Most people assume that terrorist organizations, since they operate outside of the norms of society, are immune to the vicissitudes of public opinion. In fact, most terrorist organizations, like political parties, are ultimately power seeking and see themselves as future leaders of their community, especially when the conflict involves ethno-religious and territorial disputes. Similar to Mao’s theory of the fishes and the Sea, the terrorists live and operate from within the parameters of the public and thus for many reasons which we will explore in this paper, are both cognizant and susceptible to how they are perceived by members of rival groups, the larger society in which they live, and international public opinion.This need to address public support occasionally means that if the terrorists engage in policies or strategies that are far more radical and violent than the sentiments of their publics, they risk losing their base. The terrorists may be circumscribed in the kinds of strategies they can initiate. If they engage in operations that their publics reject, there is a good chance that they will switch tactics and limit operations in the future.A case in point in the IRA’s failed “suicide” bomber campaign in 1990; during this period the IRA kidnapped and forced at gunpoint several Catholic “volunteers” for suicide car bombs. While their families were held hostage, the men were forced to ram the explosive laden vehicles into British military checkpoints. Republican Public responses to the incident were so negative that the IRA was forced to rethink this tactic and shift gears. Thus this paper argues that the terrorist organizations do not shape public opinion, rather at times, public opinion can limit (and shape) the actions of terrorists.The paper draws from theoretical assumptions of terrorism as a coercive and offensive strategy; arguments made in the civil war literature about the multiple and intimate connections between insurgent groups and the population, and primary source interviews with the IRA leadership and one of the “suicide” proxy bombers who survived his “mission.” |
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Association:
Name: ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES URL: http://www.isanet.org
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Horgan, John. and Bloom, Mia. "Missing Their Mark: The IRA Proxy Bomb Campaign of 1990" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 <Not Available>. 2010-03-12 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252406_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Horgan, J. and Bloom, M. M. , 2008-03-26 "Missing Their Mark: The IRA Proxy Bomb Campaign of 1990" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA <Not Available>. 2010-03-12 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252406_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: Most people assume that terrorist organizations, since they operate outside of the norms of society, are immune to the vicissitudes of public opinion. In fact, most terrorist organizations, like political parties, are ultimately power seeking and see themselves as future leaders of their community, especially when the conflict involves ethno-religious and territorial disputes. Similar to Mao’s theory of the fishes and the Sea, the terrorists live and operate from within the parameters of the public and thus for many reasons which we will explore in this paper, are both cognizant and susceptible to how they are perceived by members of rival groups, the larger society in which they live, and international public opinion.This need to address public support occasionally means that if the terrorists engage in policies or strategies that are far more radical and violent than the sentiments of their publics, they risk losing their base. The terrorists may be circumscribed in the kinds of strategies they can initiate. If they engage in operations that their publics reject, there is a good chance that they will switch tactics and limit operations in the future.A case in point in the IRA’s failed “suicide” bomber campaign in 1990; during this period the IRA kidnapped and forced at gunpoint several Catholic “volunteers” for suicide car bombs. While their families were held hostage, the men were forced to ram the explosive laden vehicles into British military checkpoints. Republican Public responses to the incident were so negative that the IRA was forced to rethink this tactic and shift gears. Thus this paper argues that the terrorist organizations do not shape public opinion, rather at times, public opinion can limit (and shape) the actions of terrorists.The paper draws from theoretical assumptions of terrorism as a coercive and offensive strategy; arguments made in the civil war literature about the multiple and intimate connections between insurgent groups and the population, and primary source interviews with the IRA leadership and one of the “suicide” proxy bombers who survived his “mission.” |
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Similar Titles:
Missing Their Mark: The IRA?s Failed "Human Bomb" Campaign
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The Preconditions for Ethnic Suicide Bombing Campaigns 1991-2003
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