(Page 42 of 54) - "Civilizing" the Post-Soviet European Space: A Comparison between the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) authored by Stivachtis, Yannis.

constitutive treaty, the OSCE was created by a political accord and,
consequently, its norms lack the prestige of law.

Yet, despite these weaknesses, the OSCE, under certain conditions, is able

to exert considerable social influence over post-socialist/Soviet countries.
This is done in different ways (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005:129). Firstly,
the desire of countries to remake themselves in the image of the Euro-
Atlantic in-group makes them susceptible to the social psychological effects
of being publicly shamed and praised by the OSCE that embodies the norms
and values of the in-group. Thus, policy-makers who value and aspire to join
the European in-group are sensitive to the organization’s social opprobrium
and the dissonance that comes from conduct that is inconsistent with their
self-professed norms. And even if they may not be overly concerned with
social punishment administered by the OSCE, they may wish to avoid being
shamed by powerful members of the in-group who follow up on statements
by the OSCE in their bilateral contacts with the state in question.

Secondly, the governments of the post-socialist/Soviet states wanted to

avoid the material disadvantages that are, indirectly, linked to social
punishment by the OSCE. As it was stated in the case of the CoE, the material
costs of being shamed by the organization are the result of the interlocking
nature of international institutions in Europe. Specifically, two politico-legal
factors reinforce the social influence of the OSCE in the concerned countries
by explicitly linking compliance with OSCE norms to integration into the EU or
a European perspective and thus to access to large material benefits. First,
the Europe Agreements establishing an association between the EU and
candidate countries contain a statement in the preamble reaffirming the
commitment of the signatories to the full implementation of all provisions and
principles in the OSCE documents. Similar provisions are included in the EU’s
Stabilization and Association Agreements, the Partnership and Co-operation
Agreements and, finally, the ENP, too, requires countries to show
commitment to international norms, including those of the OSCE. Clearly, the
link in these agreements and initiatives between access to EU funds and
compliance with OSCE norms enhances the ‘persuasiveness’ of the normative
pressure exercised by the OSCE. Second, the Copenhagen European Council
in 1993 spelled out, among other things, respect for minorities as one of the
conditions for accession. This gives the HCNM a significant informal voice in
the assessment by the EU of whether a country meets this membership
criterion (Kemp 2001:27). The explicit link between the organization’s
evaluation of their conformity with international norms and their relationship
with the EU enables the OSCE to punch above its weight and to use social
influence to promote pro-norm behavior. Moreover, in deciding which
countries to accept into their fold, NATO takes on board the view of the OSCE
as expressed, among other things, in its statements and reports on the
compliance of post-Socialist states with international norms. Hence, lacking
its own sticks and carrots, the OSCE’s ability to mobilize social influence
depends partly on the willingness of Europe’s most powerful political and
military institutions to let the OSCE play a gatekeeper role with regard to
countries aspiring to join them or to establish closer relations with them.