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Association: Name: ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p253088_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Grove, Jairus. "Schmitt’s Sovereign ‘Exception’, the American Constitution, and Presidential Nuclear Power" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 <Not Available>. 2009-05-23 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p253088_index.html>

Grove, J. , 2008-03-26 "Schmitt’s Sovereign ‘Exception’, the American Constitution, and Presidential Nuclear Power" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA Online <PDF>. 2009-05-23 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p253088_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: While legal historians and constitutional scholars may be correct to assume that there was never meant to be a sovereign in the White House and that judicial review and Congressional purse strings sought to guarantee that reality, these constitutional checks have not prevented the development of a nuclear sovereign. For the purposes of this paper, it will be argued that sovereignty—as defined by Schmitt as the authority to decide the exception of the law—may be debatable in the normal political landscape of the United States Federal government even up to and including conventional war, but that there is a dramatic break once we cross the nuclear threshold. The American president is not just Commander-in-Chief of nuclear weapons as if they are some subset of the armed forces; the president has the power to make the very determination of total or final war.

Cabinet Politics and Presidential Power: The transformations of executive governance in American political development

Illegal Flows, Transnational Criminal Networks and State Power: Pakistan's State Nuclear Weapons Program and the A.Q. Khan Network