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Association: Name: ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES URL: http://www.isanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p253697_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Civelekoglu, Ilke. "It Takes Two to Tango: International Organizations, Domestic Governments and Central Bank Autonomy in Emerging Markets" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA, Mar 26, 2008 <Not Available>. 2009-05-23 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p253697_index.html>

Civelekoglu, I. , 2008-03-26 "It Takes Two to Tango: International Organizations, Domestic Governments and Central Bank Autonomy in Emerging Markets" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 49th ANNUAL CONVENTION, BRIDGING MULTIPLE DIVIDES, Hilton San Francisco, SAN FRANCISCO, CA, USA <Not Available>. 2009-05-23 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p253697_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: What role do supra-national actors play in tranforming the domestic level institutions of emerging markets? Put differently, to what extent can we attribute institutional reform at domestic level to the presence of incentives provided by international institutions? This paper responds to these questions by focusing on central bank reform in Turkey and Hungary. The paper argues that reform in central bank statute is interplay of international actors and domestic politics. Basically, it contends that the presence of economic and/or political incentives provided by international organizations is not 'sufficient' to explain the kind of change that will occur. The stability and endurance of the statutory reform in central banks is embedded in governments’ ability to build an electoral coalition supportive of structural reforms in economy. Apart from ruling governments, this paper focuses on the IMF and the EU as the most influential actors. In terms of methodology, the paper employs qualitative methods and relies upon process tracing and content analysis for causal explanation. It uses EU Commission Reports, IMF Stabilization Programs and intensive interviews to deduce the arguments. The paper aims to contribute to the literature on the interaction between domestic and international politics. It supports neoliberal arguments that IOs are an essential source of reform. However, its findings point to a rationalist explanation of "when" governments are willing to support central bank reform.Overall, this paper provides a full answer to the question of why same institutions enjoy different status across countries by bringing in IR and comparative politics.

Who Owns Your Debt Matters: Domestic Commercial Bank Buying of Government Debt and Emerging Market Government Policy Autonomy

Governments and Central Banks in the Age of Financial Liberalization: What Brings an Institutional Change in the Status of Central Banks in Emerging Markets?