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Formateur Advantage in Portfolio Allocation: The Impact of Institutions |
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Abstract:
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Using data on coalition governments in 13 European countries, I demonstrate that the institutional arrangements affect portfolio allocations. In particular, the investiture vote promotes the formateur advantage, while bicameralism obstructs it. |
Most Common Document Word Stems:
parti (255), faction (243), portfolio (167), alloc (124), pm (115), within (112), ldp (111), share (90), cabinet (78), member (71), minist (67), prime (64), seat (62), popular (61), leader (56), coalit (51), govern (50), among (50), support (50), base (42), intern (39), |
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Association:
Name: MPSA Annual National Conference
URL: http://www.indiana.edu/~mpsa/
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Citation:
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MLA Citation:
| Ono, Yoshikuni. "Formateur Advantage in Portfolio Allocation: The Impact of Institutions" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National Conference, Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL, Apr 03, 2008 <Not Available>. 2009-05-23 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p266959_index.html> |
APA Citation:
| Ono, Y. , 2008-04-03 "Formateur Advantage in Portfolio Allocation: The Impact of Institutions" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National Conference, Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-05-23 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p266959_index.html |
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Using data on coalition governments in 13 European countries, I demonstrate that the institutional arrangements affect portfolio allocations. In particular, the investiture vote promotes the formateur advantage, while bicameralism obstructs it. |
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application/pdf |
| Page count: |
33 |
| Word count: |
9748 |
| Text sample: |
| PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION AS LEADERSHIP STRATEGY INTRA-PARTY ALLOCATION IN JAPAN Yoshikuni Ono Ph.D. Candidate Department of Political Science University of Michigan Abstract The single party government of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan is the result of an agreement between highly institutionalized factions and portfolios of cabinet ministries are allocated among factions within the party. How do the dynamics of portfolio allocation work within a party? Do factions work in the same way as coalition parties do? My study shows |
| 22.8 Faction Portfolio share Seat share Gap Tanaka 28.6 15.8 12.8 Fukuda 9.5 24.5 -15.0 % Nov. 1973 PM's approval rating LDP's approval rating Gap 18.0 27.2 -9.2 Faction Portfolio share Seat share Gap Tanaka 23.8 19.7 4.1 Fukuda 14.3 23.0 -8.7 % 33 |
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