Author's Keywords: authoritarian regimes, Vietnam, National Assembly, Parliament, elections, institutions, supermajorities, Geddes	Convention All Academic Convention can solve the abstract management needs for any association's annual meeting. Submission - Custom fields, multiple submission types, tracks, audio visual, multiple upload formats, automatic conversion to pdf. Review - Peer Review, Bulk reviewer assignment, bulk emails, ranking, z-score statistics, and multiple worksheets! Reports - Many standard and custom reports generated while you wait. Print programs with participant indexes, event grids, and more! Scheduling - Flexible and convenient grid scheduling within rooms and buildings. Conflict checking and advanced filtering. Communication - Bulk email tools to help your administrators send reminders and responses. Use form letters, a message center, and much more! Management - Search tools, duplicate people management, editing tools, submission transfers, many tools to manage a variety of conference management headaches! Click here for more information.
Association: Name: APSA 2008 Annual Meeting URL: http://www.apsanet.org
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p280321_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Malesky, Edmund. and Schuler, Paul. "Why do Single-Party Regimes Hold Elections? An Analysis of Candidate-Level Date in Vietnam�s 2007 National Assembly Contest" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting, Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2008 <Not Available>. 2009-05-23 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p280321_index.html>

Malesky, E. J. and Schuler, P. , 2008-08-28 "Why do Single-Party Regimes Hold Elections? An Analysis of Candidate-Level Date in Vietnam�s 2007 National Assembly Contest" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting, Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. 2009-05-23 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p280321_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: We take advantage of a unique candidate-level dataset from the 2007 Vietnamese National Assembly elections to test the core hypotheses in the literature on elections in authoritarian systems. We find persuasive evidence that the elections are structured in such a way as to yield supermajorities for regime candidates and thereby project a credible image of strength to potential opposition. We also demonstrate that central transfers were critically important in ensuring local support for favored candidates and wealth was important for local government officials, indicating an unexpected high level of pocketbook voting by Vietnamese citizens. In contrast, we find little evidence for the hypotheses that regimes like Vietnam use elections to identify talented future leaders. The findings have critical implications for the premise, common in the literature, that parliamentary elections in authoritarian systems provide a credible check on executive power and thereby greater accountability of top leaders.

Turnout in U.S House Primary and General Elections: The Importance of Candidate-Level and District-Level Race and Ethnicity

Electoral Rules and Support for the Extreme Right: A District-Level Sample Selection Model of Voting for Extreme Right Parties in Europe, 1980-2004