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Association: Name: Southern Political Science Association URL: http://www.spsa.net
Citation: URL: http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p285363_index.html Direct Link: HTML Code:

Lukasik, Jenna. "State Supreme Courts and the Political Environment:How Interest Group Participation Influences State Policy-Making" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Hotel Intercontinental, New Orleans, LA, Jan 07, 2009 <Not Available>. 2009-11-04 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p285363_index.html>

Lukasik, J. E. , 2009-01-07 "State Supreme Courts and the Political Environment:How Interest Group Participation Influences State Policy-Making" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Hotel Intercontinental, New Orleans, LA Online <PDF>. 2009-11-04 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p285363_index.html

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: Through a formal model and empirical analysis, this paper examines how a state’s political environment influences the relationship between the legislative and judicial branches. The equilibrium outcomes of the formal analysis suggest that the relationship between the coordinate branches is conditioned by the political environment. Legislators only take into account the preferences of the judicial branch when the political environment is opposed to the legislators' policy preferences. Legislators are only constrained by the judicial branch when they do not have the political capital to successfully retaliate. This conclusion is supported by an empirical analysis focusing on tort reform in the fifty states. Utilizing an event history model, the author examines how interest group participation shapes public opinion, and in turn, how the resulting political environment influences the legislative agenda. The results indicate that when interest groups are able to successfully manipulate public opinion in support of tort reform, the legislative branch will pursue reforms regardless of the preferences of the judicial branch.

Using the Stage Model of Policy-Making to Measure Economic Reform in the Transition Economies

Judicial Policy-Making in Mass Torts and the Administrative State: A Case Study of the Agent Orange Litigation

The Causes and Consequences of Time Legislators Spend Fundraising for Themselves and for their Caucuses: Modeling Effects of Institutional Design and Personal and Political Context in State Legislatures